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Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary
By Charles H. Koch, Jr.*

INTRODUCTION

Administrative agencies adjudicate massive numbers of
individual disputes, far exceeding the number resolved by courts.
Generally, administrative adjudications determine the individual
rights and duties created through an administrative program.' Similar
to the judicial process, the adjudicative function of the administrative
process involves a substantial amount of agency policy. However,
despite its importance, the development of policy within the agency
adjudicative machinery is little understood, even by the
administrative adjudicative personnel engaged in it. Therefore, a
close look at the policymaking function and the responsibility of
administrative
adjudicators, especially those at the hearing level, is
2
needed.
* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William and Mary School of

Law. B.A., University of Maryland, 1966; J.D., George Washington University,
1969; LL.M, University of Chicago, 1975. I would like to thank Michael Asimow,
John Hardwicke, William Moran, Jim Rossi, and Sidney Shapiro for their valuable
comments.
1. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT 14 (1947) ("[A]djudication is concerned with the determination of past and
present rights and liabilities."); see Paul Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication
Procedures,43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 739 n.1 (1976).
2. "The term 'policy' encompasses a wide variety of decisions that advance or
protect some collective goal of the community as a whole (as opposed to those
decisions that respect or secure some individual or group right)." I CHARLES H.
KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 6 (2d ed. 1997) (citing Ronald
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1975), reprinted in RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1977)); see HENRY HART & ALBERT
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW 141 (William Eskridge & Philip Frickey eds., 4th ed. 1994) (stating that
"[a] policy is simply a statement of objective."). Setting policy is the most
important function assigned to agencies. James Landis declared: "The ultimate test
of the administrative [institution] is the policy that it formulates; not the fairness as
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To some extent, administrative policymaking is similar to judicial
lawmaking in the general common-law system.3 Thus, this Article
looks to studies of that lawmaking process, and draws on insightful
theoretical works to aid in conceptualizing the issues.4 Empirical
studies on the influences and motivations behind judicial
decisionmaking begin the inquiry into administrative policymaking.5
However, the substantial differences between judicial lawmaking and
administrative policymaking require this Article's analysis to
ultimately reach beyond the implications of these studies.
Administrative agencies usually have considerable policymaking
responsibility and hence administrative adjudicators operate in
policy-rich environments. The agency's substantial policymaking role
serves to complicate the adjudicator's policy function more so than
the conventional judiciary. While administrative adjudicative
processes follow a hierarchy similar to the judicial process, the
adjudicators throughout administrative adjudications-from the
between the parties of the disposition of a controversy on a record of their own
making." JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 39 (1938).
3. See HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 164 ("The body of decisional law
announced by the courts in the disposition of these [individual] problems tends
always to be the initial and continues to be the underlying body of law governing
the society.").
4. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1994); Evan H.
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,46 STAN.
L. REv. 817, 852-54 (1994); Evan H. Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a
"Unified Judiciary," 78 TEX. L. REv. 1513, 1515 (2000); DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at chap. 4; HART & SACKS, supra note 2;
Federick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987) [hereinafter Schauer,
Precedent]; Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious
Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000) [hereinafter
Schauer, Incentives].
5.Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C.
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997) [hereinafter Revesz, Environmental
Regulation]; Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A
Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REv. 805 (1999) [hereinafter
Revesz, Ideology]; Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal
Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided
Courts, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685 (2000) [hereinafter Revesz, Litigation and
Settlement]; Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals,
107 YALE. L.J. 2155, 2174 (1998).
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hearing level to administrative review-have more policy-related
responsibilities than their counterparts in the conventional judiciary.
However, the role of the courts in administrative adjudications further
complicates the policymaking aspect of administrative adjudications.
Although a court's role is closely confined by the judicial review
doctrine, it necessarily injects the courts and conventional judges into
this perpetually active policymaking environment. Thus the
administrative judiciary, in this case incorporating courts, works in a
complex and dynamic policymaking context.
6
Take for example the mundane case of the Sunbeam grill.
Safeway Bread held a memorial day outing for its employees.
Safeway purchased a Sunbeam gas grill for the hamburgers and
hotdogs. The specifications for the grill called for a twenty-pound gas
tank. Safeway's head of maintenance decided that a twenty-pound
tank was inadequate and adapted the grill to use a forty-pound tank.
Unfortunately, an Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) compliance officer attended the cookout. He concluded the
grill as adapted violated the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (OSH Act) and issued a citation. Safeway requested a hearing
with the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHRC), a separate agency designed to adjudicate such violations.
Safeway argued that its conduct should be governed by OSHA's
Compressed Gases Standards.7 These standards state that "[t]he inplant handling, storage, and utilization of all compressed gases ...
shall be in accordance with Compressed Gas Association Pamphlet
P-1-1965." 8 The pamphlet did not proscribe adapting gas grills to
accommodate larger gas tanks. However, OSHA argued that the use
of the Sunbeam grill did not fall within the OSHA standard's
definition. Thus, OSHA urged that Safeway had violated OSH Act §
5(a)(1): "Each employer ...

shall furnish to each of his employees

employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or

6. Sec'y of Labor v. Safeway, Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 99-0316, 2000
Occupational Safety and Health Decisions (CCH)

[hereinafter Safeway].
7.29 C.F.R. § 1910.102 (2004).
8. Id.

32,157 (July 12, 2000)
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serious physical harm to his employees . . . . 9 After a hearing, the
administrative judge concluded that Safeway violated the Act. 10 In
the course of deciding this trivial dispute, the administrative judge
made significant policy-related choices. These choices arguably add
to the agency law regarding both the legislation and the agency's
policy pronouncement. If reviewed, the review authority would have
to develop or at least confirm these choices and thereby further add to
the body of agency law. Thus, the Safeway example confirms that any
administrative adjudicative, no matter how trivial, may confront and
even contribute to the evolution of administrative policy.
In any administrative case, the numerous agency policymaking
processes present the administrative judiciary with a complex array of
policy pronouncements. Collectively called "rulemaking," most
agencies have processes designed to carry out these responsibilities
(including any formal policy statements). Rulemaking is a quasilegislative process, and its goal is to make general pronouncements
with future effect."l Agency policy is often developed through
rulemaking. Rules, policy statements, and similar pronouncementslike legislation-often impact the public through individual
adjudications. However, like legislation, these devices are limited in
the number of individual disputes they can resolve. The
administrative judiciary must apply legislative and regulatory policy,
and in the process of doing so resolve interstitial policy issues raised
by both. Even though most agencies possess general policymaking
processes, administrative adjudications remain a critical part of
administrative policymaking. At this level, legislation is somewhat
9.29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2000). The OSHA Field OperationsManual set out a
four-part test for finding a violation of this "general duty clause." OSHA FIELD
OPERATIONS MANUAL pt. IV-4 (6th ed. 1994).

10. Safeway, supra note 6.
11. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act § 551(4) provides: "' [R]ule'
means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or
policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an
agency . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000) [hereinafter APA]. The 1961 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, after which most state APAs are modeled provides:
"' [R]ule' means each agency statement of general applicability that implements,
interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or
practice requirements of any agency." MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, 1961 Act § 1(7), 15 U.L.A. 185 (2000) [hereinafter 61 MSAPA].
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removed and the agency policy pronouncements provide another tier
of general pronouncement. Administrative adjudicators must honor
legislative policy and administrative policy resolutions, and at the
same time exercise the expansive policymaking roles they hold. This
Article explores and argues for the enhancement of the policy
contribution of administrative adjudicators.
I.

PLACE OF ADJUDICATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

Well-established administrative law doctrine holds that agencies
have considerable authority in deciding how to proceed. 12 For
generations, this doctrine has dictated that agencies may develop
policy in adjudication as well as rulemaking. The doctrine and its
impact on policymaking in administrative adjudications is best
explained by a few of the classic cases associated with its
development.
Faced with the question presented in its most basic form, the
13
Supreme Court, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery
("Chenery IF'), definitively established the authority to make agency
law in adjudication. 14 The SEC refused to approve the reorganization
of a utility company seeking reorganization under the recently
enacted Public Utility Holding Company Act because company
insiders received special advantages from their purchases. Neither the
Act nor any SEC rule proscribed the conduct. Although there was no
fraud involved, the SEC took the opportunity to establish for the first
time a policy against insider trading.
In a prior case, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery
15 ("Chenery I"), the Court stated that "before transactions otherwise
legal can be outlawed or denied their usual business consequences,
they must fall under the ban of some standards of conduct proscribed
by an agency of government authorized to prescribe such

12. For further discussion see 1 KOCH, supra note 2, § 2.12, for an
explanation of an agency's choice between rulemaking and adjudication.
13. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) [hereinafter Chenery II].
14. See id. at 203.
15. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1942) [hereinafter Chenery I].
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standards."' 6 Chenery H dispelled the notion that this language
required an agency (where the standard is unclear) to make a general
rule before proceeding through case-by-case enforcement adjucations.
In Chenery II, the Court stated: "The absence of a general rule or
regulation governing management trading during reorganization did
not affect the Commission's duties in relation to the particular
proposal before it."' 17 Thus, the Court held that the SEC may develop
administrative policy while adjudicating an individual dispute in
8
addition to developing such policy through generalized rulemaking.
Justice Jackson, dissenting in Chenery II, would have required the
SEC to give notice of the agency law before applying the lawl9-in
short, Jackson would have required the agency to first make a
generally applicable "rule." Tersely commenting on the issue,
Jackson suggested some problem with an agency making agency law
through cases under any circumstances: "Even if the Commission
had, as the Court says, utilized this case to announce a new legal
standard of conduct, there would be hurdles to be cleared . .

.20

Implicit from the remainder of the opinion, Jackson thought it
16. Id. at 92-93.
17. Chenery II, supra note 13, at 201.
18. This making of agency law or administrative policymaking must be
sharply distinguished from statutory interpretation. The distinction is crucial to the
authority of federal courts and hence it has been well expressed in that context.
Field, for example, observed that "'federal common law' ... refer[s] to any rule of
federal law created by a court ... when the substance of that rule is not clearly
suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or congressional." Martha A.
Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of FederalCommon Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 881,
890 (1986) (emphasis omitted). Merrill expressed the necessary contrast between
lawmaking and interpretation: "'Federal common law' . . . means any federal rule
of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal textwhether or not that rule can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in either
a conventional or an unconventional sense." Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985). Since agencies have
substantial policymaking authority, the distinction is crucial to allocating authority
between agencies and courts. While courts dominate statutory interpretation, they
must give considerable difference to agency policy decisions. Charles H. Koch, Jr.,
Judicial Review of Administrative Policymaking, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 375,
376 (2003). This basic doctrine makes an understanding of the workings of
administrative policymaking all the more important.
19. Chenery H, supra note 13, at 217.
20. Id. at 215. Jackson did not elaborate because that was "something the
Commission expressly declined to do." Id.
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inherently unfair to order forfeiture of property based on law created
in the same case prohibiting the conduct. Indeed, such post hoc
condemnation seems questionable in the abstract, but the commonlaw process itself contemplates such case-by-case lawmaking. 21 In
light of this tradition, and perhaps more practically because the
administrative process needs the policy development alternative even
more so than the judicial process, federal courts have refused to
second guess procedural choices of agencies. 22 In other words,
federal law does not "require rulemaking. 23
Since Chenery II, the Court has continually affirmed the general
principle that agencies have broad discretion to develop agency law
through adjudication. The most important affirmation of this
principle is found in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.24 The NLRB
21. However, even in the common-law system, courts are constrained. Federal
courts, for example, rarely have the authority to make law but are confined to some
variety of interpretation. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.1 (4th
ed. 2003); see John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in JudicialReview, 77
TEX. L. REv. 113, 121 (1998) (explaining the development of judge-made law and
its relevance to the administrative system).
22. E.g., United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 580 (6th Cir.
2003) ("Agencies have discretion to choose between rulemaking and
adjudication."); Davis v. EPA, 348 F.3d 772, 785 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Absent express
congressional direction to the contrary, agencies are free to choose their procedural
mode of administration.").
23. While required rulemaking has not been adopted in the federal system, it is
often required either by legislation or judicial decision in state administrative law. 1
KOCH, supra note 2, § 2.12. Statutes in some states require prior notice of the law,
sometimes called "required rulemaking." E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.54(1)
(Harrison 1999); Megdal v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 605 P.2d 273,
274 (Or. 1980); Cleveland Freight Lines, Inc. v. Ohio PUC, 402 N.E.2d 1192, 1195
(Ohio 1980) ("[W]hen there is not a definite commission rule, order, or decision
forbidding a particular practice, the imposition of a substantial penalty is
unreasonable."); accord, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. v. Utah PSC, 737 P.2d 983,
986 (Utah 1987). Bonfield, one of the drafters of the 1981 model state act, has long
advocated some requirement of rulemaking. ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 4.4.1 (1986); see also Jim Rossi, Overcoming

Parochialism:State Administrative Procedure and InstitutionalDesign, 53 ADMIN.
L. REv. 551, 572 (2001) ("One of the reasons for the proliferation of this doctrine
in states . . . may be that it allows better oversight of the rulemaking process,

especially given the weak oversight capacity of state legislatures when agencies
operate outside of their rulemaking processes.").
24. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
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ordered Wyman-Gordon to furnish a list of names and addresses of
employees eligible to vote in a "recognition" election. The order was
based on a general pronouncement derived from a prior
administrative adjudication, Excelsior Underwear.25 The appellate
court refused to enforce a subpoena in aid of an administrative action
against Wyman-Gordon because it found that the order was based on
a rule made in a prior adjudication and never promulgated according
to proper rulemaking procedures. Reversing the appellate court, the
Supreme Court refused to compel the agency to establish agency law
through rulemaking process before applying it to an adjudication,
affirming the principle of administrative discretion to develop agency
law in adjudication. 26 To this day, this remains the law in the federal
system.

27

25. Excelsior Underwear, 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
26. Strauss' observations about the increasing challenges to the common-law
process are relevant to its administrative version:
We could see a number of linked results from these
challenges: a heightening of judicial discretion over what issues
get decided; an emphasis on law-making rather than casedeciding as the basis on which this discretion gets exercised; a
dramatically lowered exposure of trial and intermediate courts to
principled public correction; and a temptation for the high court,
then, to speak in simple terms it might expect to have broad
impact rather than respond to the subtle particulars of complex
facts.
Peter L. Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53
ALA. L. REv. 891, 894-95 (2002).
27. A plurality of the justices indicated that, but for the unique aspects of this
particular case, they would require an agency to make a rule through rulemaking
procedure rather than allow it to announce rules of general applicability in the
course of an individual adjudication. Most administrative law practitioners belived
that if the question came up without the special facts in Wyman-Gordon, the
Supreme Court would demand rulemaking procedures for general administrative
pronouncements. This case arrived at the Supreme Court in the form of NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). Here again, the NLRB seemed to have
set a rule without using rulemaking procedures. The Board certified buyers in the
company's purchasing and procurement department as a bargaining unit. Id.at 269.
The company argued that buyers had always been considered "managerial
employees" and that the agency's decision changed the law. Id. The appellate court
agreed and said that the agency must use rulemaking to change general agency
policy. Id. The Supreme Court remanded the decision so that the NLRB could
apply the proper legal standard, but it refused to require that the NLRB use
rulemaking procedures. The Court said that an agency "is not precluded from

Spring 2005

Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary

Wyman-Gordon additionally softened the distinction between rule
and precedent in the administrative adjudicative context. Formally,
judgments in individual cases focus on resolving past issues in an
individual dispute, while rules focus on future agency policy.
Nonetheless, by definition, precedent has general applicability and
future effect. 28 More to the point, adjudicators, especially the agency
heads, often consciously aim to create agency law in their
adjudicative decisions-although usually not so blatantly as the
NLRB in the Excelsior case. Justice Black, concurring in WymanGordon, challenged the plurality's suggestion that an agency may not
make a prospective pronouncement in an adjucation. 29 Noting the
fuzzy boundary between rulemaking and adjudication, Black
observed:
[I]n exercising its quasi-judicial function an
agency must frequently decide controversies on the
basis of new doctrines, not theretofore applied to a
specific problem, though drawn to be sure from
announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and that the choice
between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the [agency's]
discretion." Id. at 294. Thus, the Court reaffirmed the well-established principle
that an agency may develop policy through adjudication.
While an adjudicative decision may have future effect as precedent, its
primary purpose is to resolve the dispute and its effect is said to be retrospective.
Unlike adjudicative decisions, administrative rules are prospective, and are
intended to have future effect as well as general applicability. Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) (Scalia J., concurring). In a
manual published shortly after the APA's enactment to advise federal agencies, the
Attorney General explained the difference:
The object of the rule making proceeding is the
implementation or prescription of law or policy for the future,
rather than the evaluation of a respondent's past conduct.
Typically, the issues relate not to the evidentiary facts, as to
which the veracity and demeanor of witnesses would often be
important, but rather to the policy-making conclusions to be
drawn from the facts.
ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 14

(1947); see also United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 244-46
(1973).
29. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 775 (Black J., concurring) ("I see no good
reason to impose any such inflexible requirement on the administrative agencies.").
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broader principles reflecting the purposes of the
statutes involved and from the rules invoked in
dealing with related problems. If the agency decision
reached under the adjudicatory power becomes a
precedent, it guides future conduct in much the same
way as though it were a new rule promulgated under
30
the rule-making power ....
This affirmed the position Black took in a dissent some 26 years
before in Chenery I, arguably the position adopted by the Court five
years later in Chenery 11.31 In Chenery I, Black asserted that an
agency is free to "evolve" its law, relying on the wisdom of prior
judicial opinion among other sources, 32 "[t]hat the Commission has
chosen to proceed case by case rather than by a general
pronouncement does not appear to me to merit criticism .... That
Act gives the Commission wide powers to evolve policy standards,
and this may well be done case by case . . . ,33 The time span
between these cases and the present has evolved this view34into one of
the most well-established doctrines of administrative law.
Thus, as it should be, policy is made in administrative
adjudications just as it is made in common-law judicial processes.
The common-law system recognizes the value of this interstitial
30. Id. at 770-71.
31. Id. at 772.
32. Chenery I, supra note 16, at 97-98.
33. Id. at 99-100.
34. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 279 (3d ed. 1999) ("[A]n agency can establish

general rules applicable to large groups of people through an order issued in a
proceeding conducted as an adjudication.");
MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 102 (2001).

ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM

T.

The idea of rulemaking by adjudication is that over time and
out of a sequence of adjudications aimed at discrete problems as
they present themselves, agency standards of broad application
should emerge. This notion . . .has been sufficiently strong to
make the case that an agency should have the discretion to
determine whether a particular problem is better solved by
rulemaking by making rules through adjudication.
Id.; KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 6.8 ("Efforts to require rulemaking have failed in federal law."); I
KOCH, supra note 2, § 2.12.
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policymaking. Because adjudicative policymaking takes place within
administrative structures exercising considerable policymaking
responsibility, administrative adjudicators have both a richer
opportunity and graver responsibility than their counterparts in the
conventional judiciary. A careful analysis of this aspect of
adjudication requires considerable attention.
administrative
Essentially, policymaking starts at the beginning of the adjudicative
process, and administrative judges have a critical role in optimizing
policymaking. Therefore, the focus must be on improving the
administrative judges' understanding of their role in the process.
11. THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF ADMINISTRAIVE LAW JUDGES
As discussed above, administrative adjudications are part of the
administrative
and
process,
policymaking
administrative
policymaking is pervasive and dynamic. The next step is to look
inside the adjudicative machinery at the distribution of policymaking
responsibilities. Traditional judicial organization dictates the
structure of the administrative adjudicative process, and that structure
helps us to understand the allocation of policymaking responsibility.
35
The Anglo-American trial is the template for adjudications.
However, while administrative adjudications use the trial as a model,
they may and often do deviate from that model, sometimes

substantially.36 Nonetheless, the basic structure replicates court
35. The trial-like model, or "formal adjudication," is sometimes required by
statute. E.g., APA, supra note 11, §§ 554, 556-57; 61 MSAPA, supra note 11, § 9;
MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1981) Article IV, chap. II
[hereinafter 81 MSAPA].
36. In developing procedural designs, administrative law has often been
eclectic, especially in its early years. For that reason, it has looked with a more
positive attitude and practical eye at the civil-law systems. Because this Article is
about one of the functions of adjudicators, it sometimes makes reference to the
judicial function and procedural usage of the civil-law system. References to the
civil-law system free the inquiry from the common-law procedural dogma because
the civil system is based on a very active role for trial-level judges. Henry Friendly,
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1290 (1975). The civil system is
judge controlled, as opposed to the common-law model which is lawyer controlled.
The civil system focuses on the judge and judges play the crucial role. It is called
the "inquisitorial" model because its doctrines aim at gaining the truth. It is no less
adversarial than the common-law "adversarial" model, as decisions are contested
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systems in terms of the hierarchy of adjudicators as well as the triallike hearing procedures employed. 37 Therefore, an agency engaging
in adjudications has a hearing-level adjudication, much like a trial
court, and at least one opportunity for appeal within the agency. The
administrative process may employ a nearly infinite number of
variations on this basic adjudicative structure and any discussion of
the allocation of policymaking within the administrative
adjudications must account for this structural diversity. 38 However,
this presents little difficulty for this discussion, because even very
informal adjudicative processes have a hierarchy of adjudicators

which match closely enough to conventional judicial organization.
Analyzing the administrative adjudicative hierarchy requires
some agreement on the terms used to distinguish adjudicative
responsibilities. The administrative officials, at all levels, engaged in
adjudicative decisionmaking will be called "administrative
adjudicators." These administrative adjudicators are distinguished
from judiciary branch judges, collectively called "the courts" or
"conventional judges." Hearing-level administrative adjudicators will
be called "administrative judges." 39 Higher-level administrative
adjudicators will be called the "administrative review authority" or

among judges as well as lawyers. The difference may be that the judges have a
moral responsibility to assure an equal and fair process, a responsibility not just to
ensure that the rules of the game are observed, but also that the decision is the best
possible. In this fundamental sense, civil-law judges share a key ethic with
administrative judges in many systems.
37. See generally LLOYD D. MuSOLF, FEDERAL EXAMINERS AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATION (1953); Gerald M. Pops, The

Judicialization of Federal Administrative Law Judges: Implications for
Policymaking, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 169 (1979).
38. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001) ("That feature
is the great variety of ways in which the laws invest the Government's
administrative arms with discretion, and with procedures for exercising it, in giving
meaning to Acts of Congress.").
39. A literal reading of the Constitution may require Congress to vest all
judicial functions in Article III courts, but long tradition has established alternative
federal courts and agencies with adjudicative functions. Richard Fallon, Of
101 HARv. L. REv.
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article 11I,
916, 916-17 (1988) (remarking that "Article III literalism" is "unthinkable"). Many
federal and state statutes refer to administrative adjudicative officials as "judges" of
some variety.
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simply the "review authority." 40 The pinnacle of authority in the
agency will be termed the "agency head," referring to either a single
official or a collegial body. The review authority may be the agency
head or some individual or body delegated the authority to review the
administrative judge's decision. In the end, the agency, as an
institution, must adopt a policy position in order for it to have weight
and hence the administrative review authority, either the agency head
or its representative, has the final word-the power to speak for the
"agency" as a whole. 4 1 Thus, the hierarchical system centralizes the
policymaking authority in a superior review authority, but the
administrative judges, sitting at the initial adjudicative stage,
necessarily play a critical role. This Article adopts the perspective
that all adjudicative officials act on and depend upon the work of
administrative judges.

40. The term "administrative judge" represents a search for a universal term. It
includes all officials-federal, state or local-who have hearing-level adjudicative
responsibilities, regardless of official title. The nature of the hearings over which
they preside varies in the level of formality, and often their specific title is affected
by the nature of the hearing. Administrative law has used any number of terms:
hearing examiner, hearing officer, or some term including the word "judge."
Previously, I have grouped them as "presiding officials." 2 KOCH, supra note 2, §
5.26. This term does not carry the necessary stature; these adjudicators are judges,
even if they are not acting under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Increasingly,
"administrative law judge (ALJ)" has been adopted as the generic term.
Unfortunately, the federal system creates some confusion because the term
"administrative law judge" has become a special civil service category, whereas all
other federal presiding officials are lumped together as "administrative judges."
PAUL VERKUIL ET AL., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 7 (1992); see
also John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-AL Hearings Programs in the Federal
Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 261 (1992). The distinction is necessary because
ALJs have special protection, whereas other presiding officials hired by agencies
have no more than the usual civil service protection. States do not adopt this
distinction and their law may employ any of a number of terms. To escape this
morass, I have adopted "administrative judge" as a universal term.
41. Daniel Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an
Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 965, 980 (1991) ("This role
of the agency head as the final adjudicating authority is recognized throughout the
[Administrative Procedure] Act.").
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A. Administrative Judges' Contributionto the Body of Agency
Caselaw
The role of the administrative judges is pivotal. Administrative
judges cannot decide individual cases without finding and applying
administrative policy. 42 A sense of obedience to that policy is driven
by the norms of stability and consistency regarding adjudicative
decisions and equality among litigants, assuring that like cases are
treated alike. On the other hand, a living administrative policy regime
requires constant adjustment. Wooden adherence to dictated policy
tips the balance too far in favor of laissezfaire.The balance between
growth and equal treatment pervades the adjudicative system. The
interaction between the "inferior" and the "superior" administrative
adjudicators dictates to some extent how that balance is struck in a
43
particular administrative program.
42. While decorum demands that the administrative judges say that they take
policy rather than make policy, this is no more true of administrative judges than it
is of trial-level judges.
[W]hile the primary task of trial judges is factfinding, legal
reasoning and interpretation of legal texts remains a vital part of
the work of a federal district judge. Indeed, some researchers
have concluded that the federal trial bench is a better-suited
laboratory for study of judicial discretion than the federal
appellate courts.
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on
the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1377, 1415 (1998) (citing Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J.
Schwab, Politicsand the Judiciary: The Influence of JudicialBackground on Case
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 263-64 (1995)). While administrative judges
focus on factfinding, they often find the need to consider policy issues. Justice
Scalia's list of judicial functions still works. He observed that, in addition to
determining credibility, administrative judges
perform many other important functions: they make findings
of fact of an often extraordinarily difficult nature, not primarily
dependent upon the credibility of demeanor evidence; they make
important decisions regarding statutory law and agency policy;
they write opinions that marshal the facts and frame the issues in
a comprehensible fashion; and they conduct proceedings so as to
assure a full and informative record.
Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco-A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 57, 71 (1979)
(emphasis added). "These functions are absolutely vital to the administrative
process." Id.
43. For example, a North Carolina statute requires the administrative judge to
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The common perception is that administrative adjudicators are
likely to be too committed to the agency's positions. 44 For example,
veterans' cases give rise to the complaint that the agency appoints
judges who are imbued with the agency's culture.45 Nonetheless, the
frequency with which adjudicators actually disagree with agency
policy is not particularly relevant to this discussion, although the
impact of those disagreements and the disturbance in the
administrative scheme are significant, even if they occur infrequently.
judges
Moreover, the point of inquiry is how free administrative
46
policy.
agency
with
disagree
to
venturing
in
feel
should
1.Precedent
This analysis begins with the question of the binding effect of
agency law created through adjudication. Stare decisis is not the rule
in administrative adjudications. 47 Thus, as a matter of doctrine,
give "due regard to the demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the agency with
respect to facts and inferences within the specialized knowledge of the agency."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-34(a) (2005); see Julian Mann III, Administrative Justice:
No Longer Just a Recommendation, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1639, 1651-52 (2001)
(observing that demonstrating expertise often presents a problem).
44. Daye's study provides support for this perception. Charles E. Daye,
Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and
Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1571, 1617 (2001) ("Thus, the small
proportion of decisions that favored the petitioners in the OAH is one part of the
picture."); Parchman v. USDA, 852 F.2d 858, 866 (6th Cir.1988).
[A] judge should be careful not to give the impression that a
particular view of the law prevents a careful consideration of the
law and facts applicable to any given case. When an entire career
has been spent in the service of one governmental agency, it can
be easy for a judge to slip into a stance that may appear to be
advocating, rather than judging, those interests.
Id.
45. James T. O'Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals
Process is Needed to Provide Fairnessto Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 228
(2001).
46. Daye found that, while administrative judges agreed with the agency about
three-quarters of the time, they disagreed in a significant number of cases. Daye,
supra note 44, at 1616.
47. Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1556 (5th Cir. 1989) ("An agency.
is not bound by the shackles of stare decisis to follow blindly the interpretations
that it, or the courts of appeals, have adopted in the past.").
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administrative adjudicators are not required to follow administrative
precedent. 48 Rather, administrative law has developed a degree of
flexibility in its approach to caselaw. On the other hand, agencies
cannot ignore their prior cases. 4 9 Thus, they are allowed to
continually adjust their precedent so long as they apply the new view
until faced with a sound reason for adjusting that view; they are
held to precedent only until a change can be justified. 51 The effect of
precedent is further weakened by the agency's authority to interpret
it. An agency has the power to interpret its own precedent as well as

48. S. Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 308 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2002)
(holding that an agency may refine, reformulate, or even reverse its precedent based
on new insights, changed circumstances, and the desire to correct a mistake).
49. Borough of Columbia v. Surface Transp. Bd., 342 F.3d 222, 229 (3d Cir.
2003) ("If an agency departs from its own precedent without a reasoned
explanation, the agency may be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously.");
Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[A]gency action is
arbitrary and capricious if it departs from agency precedent without explanation.");
Consol. Edison Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) ("Normally, an agency must adhere to its precedents in adjudicating
cases before it.").
50. South Shore Hosp., Inc., 308 F.3d at 102 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 186-87 (1991), and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)).
51. Borough of Columbia, 342 F.3d at 229; Fertilizer Inst. v. Browner, 163
F.3d 774, 778 (3d Cir. 1998); Utahns for Better Transp. v. United States Dep't of
Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1165 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Agencies are under an obligation
to follow their own regulations, procedures, and precedents, or provide a rational
explanation for their departure.") (emphasis added); Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at
1124; British Steel PLC v. United States, 127 F.3d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
But see McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026, 1035 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (allowing an agency to overrule portions of prior decisions without extensive
explanation), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). The explanation requirement
varies with the circumstances of the individual case. "If ... an agency merely
implements prior policy, an explanation that allows this court to discern 'the
agency's path' will suffice." WLOS TV, Inc. v. FCC, 932 F.2d 993, 995 (D.C. Cir.
199 1). Or, if the court finds the past agency decisions to involve materially different
situations, the agency's explanation need not be particularly elaborate. Hall v.
McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The D.C. Circuit allowed an
agency to "distinguish precedent simply by emphasizing the importance of
considerations not previously contemplated, and that in so doing it need not refer to
the cases being distinguished by name." Envtl. Action v. FERC, 996 F.2d 401,41112 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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Thus, in
to make justifiable adjustments to the precedent.
precedent has effect, but the effect is not
application, administrative
53
binding, or stare decisis.
Administrative law replaces formalism with an approach to
caselaw that balances a range of values. Stare decisis recognizes, but
overemphasizes, one of these values: stability. 54 The notion of
55
stability serves the individual values of predictability and reliance.
Undoubtedly, these considerations are important to a fair
administrative system. Citizens should be able to rely on a current
understanding of agency law and take action under some reliable
prediction of administrative reaction. Administration should seek
52. See Entergy Serv., Inc. v. FERC, 319 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Cassell v. FCC, 154 F.3d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("An agency's interpretation of
").
its own precedent is entitled to deference ....
53. A strict doctrine of stare decisis is not followed by modem courts-if it
ever was. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ("The doctrine of stare
decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the
stability of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable command."); see James C.
Rehnquist, The Power That Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the
Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REv. 345, 347 (1986); Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in ConstitutionalDecisionmaking and Theory, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 91 (1991) ('These sources of indeterminancy in dealing
with precedents have the effect of enabling the Justices to engage in conscientious
disagreements over the scope of precedents, to consider new or renewed arguments,
and to contribute to the evolution of constitutional doctrine."). Still, administrative
adjudicators are free in principle as well as practicality.
54. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 601 ("Arguments premised on the
values of reliance, predictability, and decisional efficiency all share a focus on
stability for stability's sake.").
55. Predictability and stability are integral to assuring the rule of law. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (1997); Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 357 (1978).
[A]djudication should be viewed as a form of social
ordering, as a way in which the relations of men to one another
are governed and regulated. Even in the absence of any
formalized doctrine of stare decisis or res judicata, an
adjudicative determination will normally enter in some degree
into the litigants' future relations and into the future relations of
other parties who see themselves as possible litigants before the
same tribunal.
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consistency over time and within a program, 56 yet each new precedent
potentially eliminates a viable option. 57 Schauer, while recognizing
the value of predictability, observed the trade-off between
predictability and other values. 58 He asks, without providing a
generalized answer: "To what extent is a decisionmaking
environment willing to tolerate suboptimal results in order that

people may plan their lives according to decisions previously
made?,

59

A strong commitment to precedent would prevent agencies from
responding to changing circumstances and new understandings.
Agencies must be given the freedom to adjust to the real world and to
56. The doctrine of precedent in general furthers both temporal stability and
equality:
This concern for equal treatment usually surfaces in
discussions about the temporal stability of legal rules, because
stare decisis promotes the equal treatment of individuals over
time. But equal treatment in a spatial sense seems an equally
compelling goal. . . . [G]eographical variation in otherwise
uniform rules caused by divergent judicial interpretations seems
irrational and unfair.
Caminker, supra note 4, at 852. Geographic or intra-program variation would seem
particularly repugnant in most administrative schemes. See generally Samuel
Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 735-36 (1989).
57. The evolution of agency law on a case-by-case basis creates a path
dependency problem. Each move in an individual case may cut off more
advantageous moves in the future. See ALPHA C. CHIANG, ELEMENTS OF DYNAMIC
OPTIMIZATION 5 (1992) ("This [example] serves to point out a very important fact:
A myopic, one-stage-at-a-time optimization procedure will not in general yield the
optimal path!"). The more adjudicators are held to past decisions, the less likely the
system is to arrive at the optimum results when new needs are revealed in some
future case.
58. Schauer, Precedent,supra note 4, at 598 ("[T]he value of predictability is
really a question of balancing expected gain against expected loss.").
59. Id. at 597. Kornhauser shows that this judgment is complicated by the
tension between efficient outcomes during different time periods. Lewis A.
Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 63,
89 (1989) ("In some contexts, therefore, a court will maximize social welfare by
adhering to a legal rule that fails to maximize social welfare in the particular
period."); see also Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and
Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv.93, 113 (1989) (conceding that this
observation, while critical, "greatly has enriched our understanding of a complex
legal phenomenon").
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learn from experience. The First Circuit expressed this wellestablished administrative law principle: "Experience is often the best
teacher, and agencies retain a substantial measure of freedom to
refine, reformulate, and even reverse their precedents in the light of
new insights and changed circumstances." 60 Therefore, the system
allows administrative adjudicators to weigh the need6 1for dynamic
policymaking against predictability and reliance values.
For these reasons, administrative law softens the formalism of
stare decisis, but it does not dismiss the values which support
attention to precedent. While eschewing a strong doctrine of
precedent, administrative law has adopted a balanced requirement of
consistency which dictates that, in general, like circumstances should
be treated alike. 62 That is, administrative law demands consistency in
agency adjudicative decisions as in all other administrative decisions,
60. Davila-Bardales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 27 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 1994). But see Prof 1Airways Sys. Specialists v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
809 F.2d 855, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Fidelity to law requires more than mechanical
incantations about the life and growth of the law.").
61. This freedom is recognized in the principles of judicial review.
Administrative policy decisions are reviewed for arbitrariness. Often this review
takes the form of "hard look" review, where the reviewing court assures that the
agency took a hard look at the issues. The court would arrogate policymaking
power if it took a hard look itself. For a further discussion, see 3 KOCH, supra note
2, § 12.31. In short, judicial review law facilitates policymaking by allowing the
agencies great freedom. This freedom is not justified by the studies of skewed
judicial decisionmaking used in Part III for insights into potential influences acting
on the administrative judiciary, but rather by the understanding that agencies, not
courts, are assigned the task of, and are better able to make, policy decisions. The
liberty review law provides the agencies with great scope and hence the quality and
fairness of policy depends on the administrative policymaking itself. Administrative
adjudication must be examined as one of the vehicles of that policymaking.
62. Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996).
[A]gencies do not have carte blanche. While a certain
amount of asymmetry is lawful, an agency may not 'adopt[ I
significantly inconsistent policies that result in the creation of
conflicting lines of precedent governing the identical situation.'..
. In other words, administrative agencies must apply the same
basic rules to all similarly situated supplicants.
Id. (quoting Davila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994), and Williston
Basin Int'l Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted).
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but consistency attentive to the need for dynamic administration.
2. Superior Precedent
Policies expressed by the agency head in prior opinions affect
adjudicative decisions throughout the adjudicative hierarchy. We can

start to understand the nature of the effect on administrative judges by
looking closely at the general principles of hierarchical judicial
control. Understanding the dynamics of administrative adjudication
policy, as with judicial lawmaking, starts with understanding the
nature and extent of the obedience generally required of lower-level
adjudicators. Caminker provides us with an extensive body of useful
scholarship on the question of the lawmaking function of "inferior"
courts.63 Although the "inferior" courts Caminker studies are those
below the Supreme Court, his observations about the policymaking
relationship offer insights useful for analyzing the administrative
adjudicative hierarchy.
Caminker posits a nonhierarchical system in which courts at all
levels have equal lawmaking authority. 64 Interestingly, such a system
is not merely hypothetical. As strange as such a system might feel to
common-law lawyers, Caminker notes the error in dismissing the
system as implausible because the system apparently works in civillaw countries. 65 Moreover, some administrative systems, especially in
63. Caminker, supra note 4, at 1515 (noting that levels of the judiciary "enjoy
somewhat different packages of judicial power vis-a-vis each other, depending on
their specific role and placement within the integrated and hierarchical Article III
system").
64. Caminker, supra note 4, at 826.
One can certainly imagine an institutional regime in this
country in which district courts, courts of appeals, and the
Supreme Court all behave as autonomous law-declaring actors...
[[T]he non-precedent-based hierarchy would grant district courts
great lawmaking power, subject only to case-by-case error
correction by superior courts in a limited number of instances.
Id.
65. It is legitimate to say that lower courts are not bound by higher court
decisions as in the common-law systems, hence they may and do engage in
"underruling." But, there is a difference between formality and practice here. As a
leading comparative law text observes:
A quick look round the Continent shows that matters are not
really very different there. It is true that there is never any legal
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the states to be discussed in subpart V.A, are increasingly giving the
administrative judges such autonomy. Caminker examines the
possible gains accrued from disobedience by an inferior adjudicative
authority, or "underruling." Disobedience may spur reform; indeed,
some refusal to follow prior authority is a necessary element to
reevaluation. Still, in the end, Caminker concludes that the benefits of
disobedience are ambiguous, conceding that "one might identify
discrete instances in which the benefits of forced rethinking likely
outweigh the costs, but a flat prohibition of underruling might better
balance benefits and costs over the entire range of cases."66 These
and
observations support a cabined opportunity for experimentation
67
level.
judge
administrative
the
at
even disobedience
Administrative judges also have an interpretative function that
gives them some opportunities with respect to precedent. Caminker
posits two distinct uses an inferior adjudicative authority might make
of precedent even if they felt generally obligated to apply prior
decisions. Under a literal model, the lower courts make decisions
according to their best understanding of the current law of the
superior court. 68 Under Caminker's "proxy model," the lower court
rule which compels a judge to follow the decisions of a higher
court, but the reality is different. In practice a judge of the
[French or German appellate court] today can count on being
followed by lower courts just as much as a judgment of an appeal
court in England or in the United States.
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEN KoTz, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 262

(1998).
66. Caminker, supra note 4, at 864-65.
67. One study of judges found that more qualified judges "were significantly
more likely to strike out from the mainstream and adopt marginal theories." Sisk et
al., supra note 42, at 1481. In short, the better the judges, the more likely they are
to venture to improve agency policy. It is likely that they will also make a real
contribution in doing so. This finding suggests that the better administrative judges
will display exactly the kind of "disobedience" that will contribute to the
policymaking enterprise. This not only confirms that we should seek the best
administrative judges, but my study found that federal administrative judges (state
judges were not studied) have fairly high qualifications. Charles Koch, Jr.,
Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 271, 290 (1994)
("The quality of the presiding officials as a group is impressive and there is little
difference between the qualifications of ALJs and Ms [judges with formal APA
protection and those without].").
68. Caminker terms this model, somewhat confusingly, the "precedent" model,
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attempts to put itself in the place of the superior court and predict
how that court would decide the case. 69 Caminker found that "it is
difficult to credit the claim that inferior courts obey superior court
precedents because inferior courts must independently interpret the
law and the precedents count as a part of that law-indeed, a part
superior to other sources of written law.",70 He suggests instead that
"when there is a higher court precedent on point, lower courts do not
themselves interpret and apply the law; rather, they apply the law as
their superior court has interpreted it."'7 1 Thus, an administrative
judge, like a lower court, is using the precedent rather than "obeying"
it. The administrative judge is attempting to predict how the agency
will decide the case rather than simply following prior decisions.
Whether an inferior adjudicator should approach superior precedent
in this way is not clear: "[P]redictive behavior ought to be deemed a
proper exercise of judicial power if it is consistent with the
,,72 Thus, the agency and its adjudicators
institutional values .
might best interact on the issue. Caminker would not choose the
predictive model unless it would "actually generate greater
correspondence" within the adjudicative hierarchy. 73 Caminker finds
that obedience generally should be the norm, with some allowance
for creative deviation.
Obedience to the highest authority's decisions produces the
economic results of fewer cases and efficient resolution of recurring
issues. Schauer found, as a major justification relevant to
conserves
obedience
that
adjudications,
administrative
decisionmaking resources. 74 Caminker tested the proposition that
"the desire to reduce the inefficiencies a multitiered adjudicatory
process generates justifies present doctrine." 75 He found that "judicial
economy provides a strong rationale for a duty to obey hierarchical
even though the two models both begin with the precedent. Evan H. Caminker,
Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspect of Inferior Court
Decisionmaking,73 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1994).
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id. at 26.
71. Id. at 27 (referring to this as the "subject-transfer" perspective).
72. Id. at 31.
73. Id. at 44. This finding depends on the data used to make the predictions.
74. Schauer, Precedent,supra note 4, at 599.
75. Caminker, supra note 4, at 839.

Spring 2005

Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary

precedent only in certain contexts. 76
The call for obedience in the administrative adjudicative context
is heightened by the evolution of the administrative judge position.
Shapiro observed that obedience to higher precedent in the
administrative process should recognize the sub-delegation of
authority from which the administrative judges act.7 7 The
adjudicative hierarchy, including the evolution of today's
administrative judges, began because the agency heads could not
preside at hearings themselves. 78 Thus, administrative judges began
as agents of the agency head and have retained this character despite
evolving into a discrete institution. In this respect, they are quite
distinct from the lower courts. Attention to the dictates of the higher
authority, at least in policy matters, is compelled by administrative
as the aforementioned
law's general allocation of authority as well
79
generalized benefits for sound adjudication.
The judicial approach to superior precedent has ramifications for
the public at large. If judges do no more than apply the precedent as it
exists, guidance information is available and concrete. The more
judges stray from strict application and literal interpretation, the less
confidence the public has in its understanding of agency policy.
Hence, freeing the judges leaves the litigant and the public less sure
of agency law. However, it also presents the public with an
opportunity in the face of contrary law. The approach to superior
precedent then creates a continuum between certainty and clarity on
76. Id. at 841.
77. Sidney Shapiro, comments (on file with the author).
78. FINAL

REPORT

OF

THE

ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S

COMMITTEE

ON

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 43 (1941) ("The heads of the agency cannot, through

press of duties, sit to hear all the cases which must be decided.").
79. This history explains to some extent why administrative appellate review is
de novo. The federal APA codifies this tradition when it provides: "On appeal from
or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have
in making the initial decision . . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000); Janka v. Dep't of
Transp., 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that Section 557(b) provides
that the decision of a presiding officer does not become the decision of the agency
if there is "an appeal to... the agency" and that the agency may therefore conduct
"plenary review of an AL's decision"). However, some administrative schemes,
particularly in the states, impose more limited review. Rossi, supra note 23, at 572.
If such a scheme is limited to the administrative review authority's ability to
"correct"findingsoffact, the shift of burden can be justified.
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the one hand and the opportunity, both for the agency and the
litigants, for dynamism and tailoring to individual circumstances.
Administrative law recognizes that a strong sense of precedent
may affect the system's ability to do individual justice. In his study of
the massive Social Security Administration adjudications, Mashaw
observed:
Objectification

presumptions,

the

of

standards,

routinization

the

of

use

of

evidentiary

to
all tend to overgeneralize,
development,
pigeonhole, to leave gaps. Rulemaking necessarily
constrains sensitive exercise of individualized
discretion. This characteristic of clear decision rules,
like vagueness, can introduce errors or skew them
8°
systematically and inappropriately in one direction.
In recognition of this dilemma, administrative law has adopted
the view that wooden reliance on precedent may create unfairness and
injustice if not tempered with individualizing discretion. 8t
While the judges should have some freedom then to adjust or
even disobey superior precedent, reasonably strong control by the
administrative review authority is necessary to allow it to balance
flexibility and growth of agency policy against consistency and
equality. 8 2 The opinions of higher adjudicative authorities have the
80. JERRY MASAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY

DIsABmrrY CLAIMS 107 (1983) (emphasis added).
81. Brehmer v. FAA, 294 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
A "policy" is just that .... It indicates the standards an
agency generally will follow in conducting its operations. It is
not, however, a black letter rule that the agency is required to
follow in all cases without regard to the circumstances of the
particular situation before it.
Id.
82. Administrative adjudicators, like courts, are likely to attempt to protect
their policy choices. Studies demonstrate that judges formulate their actions so as to
protect their policy preferences. Smith and Tiller delved into the strategies lower
courts undertake to protect their policy choices. Joseph Smith & Emerson Tiller,
The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61
(2002). Thus, they identify that "a key insight of the strategic instrument theory is
that the policy choice of the court is reflected through a combination of the court's
policy outcome and instrument selection, not through the policy outcome alone." Id.

Spring 2005

Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary

benefit of analysis percolating through the adjudicative machinery
with the lower-level adjudicators providing differing analyses and
reaching different conclusions in individual cases. 83 Lower-level
policy-related freedom requires the availability of administrative
review to assure against improper or incorrect policy determinations.
Justice seems best served by a norm of obedience in which the lowerlevel adjudicators generally seek to obey agency policy expressed in
superior precedent, and where an administrative review authority
representing the agency as an institution is available to test that
obedience but take advantage of studied disobedience.
So, in many ways, rather than engaging in the "correction" of the
policy conclusions of administrative judges, the agency is capturing
the benefits of different perspectives. The judges bring an individual
and a "street-level" perspective, and the agency adds sensitivity to
societal and cumulative values. 84 The system acquires some balance
when the administrative judges force the agency to justify cumulative
objectives as against practical reality and individual consequences.
On the other hand, like trial judges, administrative judges are not held
to the same level of external scrutiny. 85 The review stage serves the
dual function of holding a judge responsible outside the hearing room
and allowing for the open analysis of a judge's initiatives. Thus, a
review authority must have the final say, but it should measure lowerlevel decisions against policy integrity, the potential for
improvements on the prior policy position, and valuable specificity in
at 68. Both the judge and the agency are likely to choose actions that protect their
policy choices and somewhat confuse the pure policy issue. Avoiding the question
of whether the agency should act in such a way to protect its policy, its judges
should not attempt through strategic behavior to limit the agency's policy choices.
The judges' job, in fact, is to alert the agency to the policy issues first, and offer
their own solution second.
83. Caminker, supra note 4, at 860. Caminker concedes that some jurists and
scholars are skeptical. Id.
84. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941) ("Cabinet officers
charged by Congress with adjudicatory functions are not assumed to be flabby
creatures any more than judges are. Both may have an underlying philosophy in
approaching a specific case."); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948).
85. See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 188 (1998) (noting that district court judges "sit alone and
do not have the benefit of the intellectual debate among a panel").
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application.
However, the appeal and review process is necessarily fitful and
reactive, and hence often incapable of assuring either general policy
integrity or optimum policy development. 87 Although the opportunity
for a superior tribunal to deal with a variety of lower-level
approaches enhances the agency's policymaking, both as the ultimate
adjudicative authority and in performing its other policymaking
functions, the opportunity presented by review is not sufficient. More
creative alternatives should supplement the appeal and review
process in order to better capture these advantages. Such alternatives
might include disciplining judges who fail to uphold policy
integrity. 88 Independence might be insured by a body comprised of
other judges." More positive approaches to interaction on policy,
86. Many administrative review authorities, but not all, are collegial as well.
87. "In very broad terms, if the head of the agency remains relatively free to
reverse the ALJ, the values of expertise and political accountability predominate. If
the head of the agency is bound to defer substantially to the ALJ, the value of
objectivity and its appearance are dominant." William R. Andersen, Judicial
Review of State Administrative Action-Designing the Statutory Framework, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 523, 556 (1992). A controversy has persisted for generations as to
the reliability or even existence of objective expertise in the administrative process.
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2260-64
(2001). Justice Breyer urges a return to the concept of expertise, but this view
continues to be contested. Id. at 2262-63 (citing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VIcious CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 61, 73-74 (1993)); Bruce
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARv. L. REV. 633, 697-715
(2000). Ackerman is described as "another prominent member of the new expertise
movement." Kagan, supra, at 2262 n.52.
88. Koplow and I studied the Social Security administrative review authority,
the "Appeals Council." We found that in mass justice programs particularly, the
traditional appellate review apparatus was insufficient to assure "policy integrity."
More aggressive measures, such as sampling cases involving target areas, was
necessary-at least in an administrative adjudicative system that handles a massive
caseload-both to assure consistency and to allow the agency to come to grips with
complex questions raised within the expanse of SSA adjudications. Charles Koch,
Jr. & David Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the Operation and
Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 199, 279 (1990).
89. Consistent disobedience creates gaps which do not contribute to policy
evolution, but can only be considered capricious and hence might justify
disciplinary or training-type approaches. Stephens v. Merit System Personnel Bd.,
986 F.2d 493, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that decisional independence does not
prevent an agency from requiring additional training as a disciplinary device).
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such as conferences and training sessions, might be considered. 90 The
experience and views of judges might be sought in the context of
rulemaking.
3. Horizontal Precedent
In addition to careful, but flexible, attention to opinions from the
superior authority as a way to optimize the policymaking role of the
administrative judge, a judge also contributes by providing opinions
for colleagues. 91 "Horizontal" precedent, the impact of prior
Members of the conventional judiciary face administrative discipline for failing to
faithfully apply the law, and administrative judges should also face some discipline
for failures regarding agency law. Steven Lubet, a judicial ethics expert, describes
as unacceptable instances in which "[s]ome judges have demonstrated utter
ignorance of the law, or sheer disregard for it, some going so far as to decide cases
on the basis of 'coin flips."' Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and Judicial
Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 59, 72 (1998). Under such
circumstances, disciplinary machinery is necessary to assure accountability. Lubet
identified four compelling circumstances justifying disciplinary action based on
legal misconduct: (1)a pattern of repeated and uncorrected legal error; (2) errors
exceeding some "egregiousness quotient," including "[a] willful refusal to follow
the law, as distinct from an honest and acknowledged difference of opinion or
interpretation, may manifest unfitness for judicial office"; (3) legal errors which
cannot be corrected on appeal; and (4) decisions constituting a "complete
abdication of the judicial function." Id. at 72-74. The key is curing these consistent
breakdowns in accountability without compromising independence. Id. at 65
("Accountability and independence are not mutually exclusive; most often, we can
have both.").
90. Something like this was attempted in the Social Security Administration.
"The SSAB [Social Security Advisory Board] was created as an oversight body
when the SSA became an independent agency in March of 1995. But the SSAB,
though effective at the conceptual level, is not in a position to carry out actual
management reforms." Verkuil, supra note 1, at 729. As discussed below, many
states have constituted independent offices which supply administrative judges to
various agencies. Under the Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency,
the chief judge may monitor the quality of the judges' performance. Christopher
McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency: Promises,
PracticalProblems, and a Proposalfor Change, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 475, 498-500
(2001). A long time chief ALJ disagrees with the idea that chief judges should have
the power to impose uniform law or policy. John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel
Movement: A Work in Progress,53 ADMIN. L. REv. 419, 440 (2001).
91. Judge John Hardwicke, long time chief Administrative Law Judge for
Maryland, expressed concern over this possibility. He suggested that conversations
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decisions by other administrative judges, raises another category of
questions. As previously discussed, the agency adjudicators are not
bound by prior opinions. 92 Similar to an equity court, the
administrative judge seeks to provide individual justice. Although the
decisions of a higher adjudicative authority may represent agency law
that a judge cannot ignore, the opinions of comparable judges have
no formal authority. However, to further the goals of consistency and
informed decisionmaking, judges must not ignore the work of their
colleagues. Schauer observed that precedent equalizing dissimilar
decisionmakers-that is, honest disagreement among judges-while
beneficial to the reformation of a body of law, can create
inconsistencies incompatible with the fair resolution of individual
cases. 93 Administrative judges should conform to prior decisions,
even those they disagree with, in order to assure an even-handed
process. 94 More specifically, an administrative system must strike a
balance between equal treatment and individualizing discretion, and
individual programs might weigh these two values differently in
requiring consistency among judges.
between the judges and the agency head were too dangerous and should not be
permitted: "Never, never should a judge discuss on-going litigation with an
outsider, including especially the agency or any other executive functionary." John
Hardwicke, comments (on file with author). Nonetheless, he approved of panel
discussions involving judges, government attorneys, members of the bar, and the
general public. The failure to include the agency loses some of the advantage both
for the judges and the agency, hence those representing the agency might be
included with considerable thought to safeguards.
92. The APA seems to require an opinion. APA, supra note 11, § 557(c).
93. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 600. A study of the federal
administrative judiciary concluded:
The potential for interdecisional inconsistency increases with
increases in the number of independent adjudicatory officers,
increases in the difficulty of the disputes they resolve, and
increases in the degree of subjective or normative judgment
required to resolve the disputes. The potential for significant
interdecisional inconsistency is a major concern because it
violates a cardinal principle of our system of justice-like cases
should be resolved in like manner.
VERKUIL ET AL.,

supra note 40, at 139.

94. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 588 ("The most obvious
consequence, of course, is that a decisionmaker constrained by precedent will
sometimes feel compelled to make a decision contrary to the one she would have
made had there been no precedent to be followed.").

Spring 2005

Policymnaking by the Administrative Judiciary

However, a strong sense of horizontal precedent may be unfair to
those affected by the agency's programs, especially in mass justice
programs. The sheer burden of collecting related cases renders
horizontal precedent impractical for society's disadvantaged and their
overstretched representatives. 95 Indeed, this unfairness is a driving
force behind administrative law's preference for rules. In short,
horizontal precedent is often inappropriate for a particular
administrative program. While administrative judges should share
knowledge and experience in handling individual cases, true authority
should not be given to a colleague's prior treatment of cases in most
adjudicative settings.9 6

4. Conclusion
Practical as well as normative factors counsel in favor of
obedience to the decisions of a higher administrative authority. This
obedience may be tempered by the need to render individual justice,
and under proper circumstances, the need to begin the adjustment of
existing agency law. However, horizontal precedent should be given
little weight. Administrative judges may be influenced by the wisdom
of their colleagues, but they should not feel any formal compulsion to
follow their lead.97 Regardless, the policy role of administrative
95. Gifford, supra note 41, at 997 ("In a mass-justice agency, adjudication is
unsuited for use as a vehicle for announcing or formulating policy. The cases come
too fast and in too great a volume for decisionmakers to look to other cases as
guides .... ).
96. Agencies should facilitate judges' ability to share their views and
experiences in other forms and forums. Conferences and training are obvious ways
to accomplish this. Judges might also be encouraged to consult on individual cases.
However, to the extent it applies to administrative judges, the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct allows judges to consult with court personnel and other judges
only for emergency and administrative purposes. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(c) cmt. [5] (2003) [hereinafter ABA CODE].
97. It is only those cases in which the judges show careful attention to the
broader impact of their decision that other judges should consider the effect as
something similar to precedent. On the other hand, the potential for future impact
may distract hearing-level judges from their primary duty of deciding individual
disputes. Schauer, Precedent, supra note 4, at 588. One study suggests that courts
may decide not to publish opinions for fear that the opinions will create bad
precedent. See generally Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 85.
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judges determines the nature of adjudicative policymaking in each
program. Each agency should be conscious of this role and
incorporate it in to their policymaking arsenal.98 In the end, the
agency is best situated to appraise the contribution an administrative
judge may make to its policymaking.
B. IncorporatingAgency Rules into Adjudicative Decisions
Administrative judges primarily rely on rules and general policy
pronouncements for a general policy framework because most of an
agency's policy is embodied in rules and general policy
pronouncements rather than caselaw. 99 The agency head promulgates
98. The agency might also consider what support is available to administrative
judges making these policy-related decisions. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
to the extent it applies to administrative judges, provides a very narrow concession
to consultation with legal experts. ABA CODE, supra note 96, at Canon 3B(7)(b)
("A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law... if the judge
gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice,
and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond."). Consultation with
experts in order to contribute to administrative policy, or "agency law," might be
considered the equivalent of courts seeking legal expertise. However, this
administrative law adaptation can be questioned. It might be consistent with the
spirit of this provision for an administrative judge to consult a legal expert on the
interpretation of agency policy, either in rules or precedent. Id. at cmt. 10 ( "'Law'
denotes court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions and decisional
law."). But, it may stretch the spirit of this freedom too far to allow a judge to
consult on the wisdom or modification of agency policy. In addition, the APA
prohibition against ex parte communication may be an impediment. APA, supra
note 11, § 557(d); see also 81 MSAPA, supra note 36, § 4-213 (regarding the
states). Arguably this provision, however, might leave room for consultation with
special experts who have no stake in the outcome, and it might be read to require
only that such consultations be noticed. To some extent, the law is more generous
when it comes to consultation with agency staff not involved in the adjudication.
White v. Indiana Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[N]on-record
discussions between an agency's decision makers and members of the agency's
staff are common and proper."); see Greenberg v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 968 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that separation of function
standards are lower for administrative judges than federal judges). If an agency
wants to optimize the policy contribution of its judges, it might work out some
principled opportunity for them to consult. Formal guidelines and instructions may
serve to legitimize support.
99. "[T]here is rulemaking, which has in the [1970s] replaced adjudication as
the central mechanism of agency law giving." Scalia, supra note 42, at 72.
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rules, and administrative law doctrine compels the agency to obey the
rules or justify its disobedience. Throughout the hierarchy, agency
adjudicators-including administrative judges-are required to apply
rules and policy pronouncements. Thus, the melding of rules and
other policy pronouncements into individual adjudicative decisions
raises complex questions regarding the allocation of authority within
the administrative structure. Often administrative judges' treatment of
policy pronouncements creates great tension within a program's
administration. A close look at the proper role of these
pronouncements in a program's adjudication is needed. Additionally,
this Article will consider the possible contribution of administrative
judges to the quality of an agency's general policy pronouncements.
An agency must obey its own rules in order further the goal of
consistency. 100 The basic doctrine for this requirement is derived
from three "red baiting" cases. The first and most influential, United
States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,'0 ' involved efforts by the
Attorney General to deport "unsavory characters." The petitioner
applied for suspension of deportation, which according to INS rules,
should have been decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals. The
rule required the Board to exercise its discretion, and the Attorney
General's efforts to avoid INS rules were found by the Court to be
by two similar cases firmly
impermissible. Accardi was followed
02
principles.'
general
establishing these
100. A.D. Transp. Express, Inc. v. United States, 290 F.3d 761, 766 (6th Cir.
2002) ("When an agency promulgates regulations it is . . . bound by those
regulations."); Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("The
Accardi doctrine requires federal agencies to follow their own rules, even gratuitous
procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary actions."); Ctr. for Auto Safety v.
Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (recognizing "the principle that a court
will require an agency to follow the legal standards contained in its own regulations
despite the fact that a statute has granted the agency discretion in the matter"). This
is the law in the states as well. E.g., State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Indianapolis
Racquet Club, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 247, 251-52 (Ind. 2001); Hudson v. Dep't of Corr.,

703 A.2d 268, 273 (N.J. 1997) ("[A]n administrative agency ordinarily must
enforce and adhere to, and may not disregard, the regulations it has promulgated.").
101. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
102. In Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957), the Supreme Court found that

the discharge of a foreign service officer for disloyalty violated regulations of the
State Department. Id. at 388. Similarly, the Court in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S.
535 (1959), reinstated an Interior Department employee who had been charged with
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Though the doctrine is well-established, it is not inflexible.
Equally well-established is the proviso that an agency may deviate
from its rules for good cause. 10 3 Administrative judges face a duty to
be faithful to the agency's policy decisions, and this duty strengthens
the need to obey the agency's rules and policy pronouncements.
Additionally, a judge's failure to obey an agency policy reflects
poorly on the agency-the judge's violation is the agency's violation.
However, a judge may be in the best position to see reasons for an
individual or even a general modification of an agency rule. Thus, an
administrative judge should have flexibility to deviate from an
established policy as long as the judge can adequately justify the
deviation. However, because it is the agency who will ultimately be
held accountable, the agency must make the final decision regarding a
deviation or change.
The question of application is complicated because administrative
rules may have differing force and administrative adjudicators may be
bound in differing ways. Legislative rules are promulgated pursuant
to delegated authority through public procedures and consequently
carry the force of law. 1 4 Since policy pronouncements acquire the
force of law, an agency may have a special duty to follow its own
"sympathetic association" with communists in violation of the Department's own
regulations. Id. at 537.
103. The Court in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), established

the principle that an agency does not violate due process when it fails to follow its
own rules. Id. at 741-42. Joshua Schwartz observed:

Accardi contains a passing ambiguous reference that might
suggest a due process foundation for agencies' obligation to
follow their own regulations. But the overall tenor of the opinion
suggests that the Court considered this obligation a necessary
consequence of the regulations' status as law binding on private
parties.
Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel
Remedies for an Agency's Violation of Its Own Regulation or Other Misconduct.,

44 ADMiN. L. REv. 653, 671 (1992).
104. The foundational case is Caceres,- in which the Court accepted the
agency's assertion that following the rule would have interfered with a criminal
investigation. 440 U.S. at 752-54; see also Revak v. Nat'l Mines Corp., 808 F.2d
996, 1002 n.10 (3d Cir. 1986); Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 664 F.2d 79, 83 (5th Cir.
1981) ("In certain instances, no doubt, FERC may exercise its equitable discretion
and stray from the use of its general regulations. In order to do so, however, FERC
must articulate valid reasons for the departure.").
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legislative rules unless it expresses

a strong reason justifying

rules bind agency adjudicators until
disobedience. 105 Therefore, these
10 6
revoked.
or
amended
the rule is
Such policy pronouncements are distinct from policy statements
which do not purport to be made from delegated authority and
consequently do not carry the force of law. 0 7 Though several terms
can be used to describe these pronouncements, this Article will
collectively call them "nonlegislative" rules. ° 8 Nonlegislative rules
are a categorically different type of pronouncement from legislative
rules, and this difference should be reflected in the weight given by
an agency's adjudicators. 109 A nonlegislative rule is a device for
announcing policy. 1 0 They are intended to disclose the agency's
105. E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) ("Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."); Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 296 (1979); O'Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loan,
Inc., 319 F.3d 732, 740 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Where . . . agency regulations are
promulgated under express congressional authority, they are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.")
(quoting Chevron, 476 U.S. at 844).
106. Clean Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 333 (3d Cir. 1995); Cmty.
Action, Inc. v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 347, 352 (10th Cir. 1989).
107. An agency may change its rules. Voyageurs Region Nat'l Park Ass'n v.
Lujan, 966 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1992); Romeiro De Silva v. Smith, 773 F.2d
1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 1985) ("An agency is bound by its regulations so long as they
remain operative, but may repeal them and substitute new rules in their place."); see
also Macey, supra note 59, at 97 (responding to Kornhauser's observations about
the tension between efficient outcomes in different time periods by noting that the
legislature may change inefficient legal rules).
108. E.g., Farrell v Dep't of Interior, 314 F.3d 584, 590 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(concluding after a survey of authority that "[t]he general consensus is that an
agency statement, not issued as a formal regulation, binds the agency only if the
agency intended the statement to be binding").
109. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Public Procedures for the Promulgation of
Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEO. L.J. 1047, 1048
(1976); see also Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of
Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1977).
110. E.g., Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. FERC, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).

"Policy statements" differ from substantive rules that carry
the "force of law," because they lack "present binding effect" on
the agency. When an agency hears a case under an established
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views and offer guidance regarding agency law."' Thus, an agency
must obey these pronouncements as well as legislative rules unless a
deviation can be justified."'
However, an administrative judge may have considerably more
freedom regarding those policy pronouncements that are not
legislative rules." 3 In Morton v. Ruiz, 1 4 the Supreme Court held that
policy statement, it may decide the case using that policy
statement if the decision is not otherwise arbitrary and capricious.
Id.
111. One brand of nonlegislative rule, "statements of policy," may not have a
binding effect on the agency, resulting in even more ambiguous application to
administrative judges. Several courts distinguish statements of policy from other
nonlegislative rules because the latter are not "binding norms" which control the
agency. For example, the D.C. Circuit described a statement of policy in these
terms:
An agency policy statement does not seek to impose or elaborate or
interpret a legal norm. It merely represents an agency position with respect
to how it will treat-typically enforce-the governing legal norm. By
issuing a policy statement, an agency simply lets the public know its
current enforcement or adjudicatory approach.... [P]olicy statements are
binding on neither the public, nor the agency.
Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
A statement might not be binding because it serves the dual purpose of
"informing the public of the agency's future plans and priorities for exercising its
discretionary power," as well as educating and providing direction to agency
personnel who are required to implement the agency's policies and exercise its
discretionary powers in specific cases. Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006,
10 13 (9th Cir. 1987). A statement acts only prospectively and it does not establish a
"binding norm." Id. at 1014. Nonetheless, even a statement may confine the
agency's discretion where it would be unfair to deny the statement some effect.
Ronald Levin urges that statements and interpretative rules have virtually the same
effect. Ronald M. Levin, Nonlegislative Rules and the Administrative Open Mind,
41 DuKE L.J. 1497, 1503 (1992).
112. Michael Asimow, Guidance Documents in the States: Toward a Safe
Harbor,54 ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 632 (2002).
Virtually every administrative agency produces guidance
documents expressing its view about the meaning of language in
statutes and regulations . .

.

. Guidance documents of general

applicability are enormously important to members of the public
who seek to plan their affairs to stay out of trouble and minimize
transaction costs.
Id.
113. Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("The Accardi
doctrine requires federal agencies to follow their own rules, even gratuitous
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an agency should not feel bound by its nonlegislative rules in the face
of overriding considerations."1 5 Ruiz applied for assistance from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and was denied assistance because of
a provision in the BIA manual limiting eligibility to Indians living
"on reservations." Ruiz and his wife left the reservation to live in an
Indian community a short distance from the reservation and applied
for assistance during a prolonged labor strike. The Court found that
the manual was not binding on the agency because it was not a
legislative rule.' 16 The Court held that the agency should7 not follow
the nonlegislative rule where the result would be unfair. 11
This doctrine's real impact may be felt only in situations where
the administrative judge has some freedom in application. Thus, the
impact of nonlegislative rules and policy pronouncements on
administrative judges becomes complicated. An administrative judge
should not apply a nonlegislative rule if its application would be
unfair. Hence, a judge may not be technically bound by an agency
policy pronouncement that is not made pursuant to a delegated8
authority-meaning they may be bound only to legislative rules."
One example involved a seventeen-year-old woman with brain
damage who was able to remain at home with extensive nursing help.
The agency sought to downgrade the level of home nursing help,
relying on a North Carolina Medicaid manual. The administrative
judge , reviewing the change in status, found that the manual's list of
criteria for justifying the enhanced service was not exhaustive, and
ruled for the claimant." 9 Logically the Ruiz doctrine begins at the
procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary actions."); Lake Mohave Boat
Owners v. Nat'l Park Service, 138 F.3d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1998).
114. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
115. Id. at 232.
116. E.g., Id. at 233-35; United States v. Alameda Gateway Ltd., 213 F.3d
1161, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a litigant could not rely on a regulation
because it was not intended to be binding but to act as guidance); Warder v.
Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 82 (1st Cir. 1998).
117. Morton, 415 U.S. at 233-35.
118. See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum:
Assuring ProperRespect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 803 (2001)
(arguing generally that "publication rules," though lacking the force of law, are
important to the system, and so judges should not discourage reliance upon them).
119. Roberts v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 02 DHR 1138, 2003 WL
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hearing-level in order to facilitate the exercise of individual
discretion in decisionmaking.
However, it is the extent of the judge's discretion that presents the
real question. For years, courts have been bound by "Skidmore
20
deference" when reviewing the application of nonlegislative rules.'
This dictates that a court, while not bound to the rule, may find that
the nonlegislative rule has the "power to persuade. ' 2 1 Under Ruiz, if
the agency has a duty not to inflexibly apply a nonlegislative rule,
then perhaps administrative judges are justified in following a
nonlegislative rule only to the extent they find the rule persuasive.
While they are not authorized to change nonlegislative rules, they
may adjust policy pronouncements under certain circumstances.
Moreover, rules rarely answer all the questions raised in an
adjudication, and administrative judges often have no choice but to
engage in interpretation of various types of policy pronouncementsboth legislative and nonlegislative. The agency has considerable
interpretive discretion, and it is well-established that an agency has
broad authority to interpret its own rules. 122 Since the agency is
21638171 (N.C.O.A.H. Apr. 25, 2003).
120. The classic statement:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of
the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The Court has consistently referred
to this formulation. E.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2001)
(finding that an agency's ruling may be merely persuasive); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (refusing to apply the EEOC guidelines).
121. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
122. The classic authority for this proposition is Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945) (stating that "[s]ince this involves an
interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the
administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in
doubt"), but the most cited case is Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (dealing
with agency interpretations in general). The Supreme Court continually reaffirms
this long-standing approach. E.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588
(2000) ("lAin agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to
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conceded such broad authority to interpret rules and policy
pronouncements, and even to engage in justified deviation, it follows
that the agency's administrative judges may also do so-but
carefully.123 Like superior precedent, judges might interpret rules in
deference."); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 356 (2000); Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 463 (1997); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44
(1993); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112 (1992); Martin v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991).
Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or
changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise
and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power
authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of
the agency's delegated lawmaking powers.
Id. In Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415 (1988), the court stated:
[W]hen it is the Secretary's regulation that we are construing,
and when there is no claim in this Court that the regulation
violates any constitutional or statutory mandate, we are properly
hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the Secretary's
unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's
plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at
the time of the regulation's promulgation.
Id. at 430; see also Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs,
484 U.S. 135, 159 (1987). The lower courts also often express this doctrine. E.g.,
Wells Fargo Bank of Texas NA v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 2003)
(stating that "where ...the regulation is ambiguous as to the precise issue in
contest, an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless it is
clearly erroneous"); Clark Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 314
F.3d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Under the APA, an agency's interpretation of a
regulation must be given controlling weight unless it is 'plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation."') (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512
U.S. 504, 512 (1994)). But see Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588 ("Auer deference is
warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous ....To defer to
the agency's position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting
a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation."); Moore v. Hannon Food Serv.,
Inc., 317 F.3d 489, 494-96 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding the requirement that the rule be
ambiguous was shared among the circuits, the court refused to give deference to the
agency's interpretation of clear language).
123. Interpretation may not constitute amendment or repeal, so even the agency
head may not use interpretation in an adjudication because a rule must be amended
or repealed by the same procedure with which it was promulgated. 1 KOCH, supra
note 2, § 4.60[2]. If the need for amendment is identified in adjudication, or if the
interpretation cannot make the necessary adjustment without constituting an
amendment, then the adjudicators must commend the issue to the policymaking
processes of the agency.
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order to develop agency policy.' 24 Policy change must percolate up
through the process, and hence each level has a role in sharpening the
rule through interpretation. A judge's interpretation provides
experience, which the rule and its policy will use to develop. Judges'
interpretations additionally provide perspective on the policy's
application, giving the agency "samples" for use in evolving future
policy. Adjustments within the terms of the rule neither challenge the
agency's authority nor unduly upset stability and equality. While
judges may pay close attention to the language and clear meaning of a
rule, a potential policymaking contribution exists when judges look
behind the rule to conclude that strict application of the rule would
not further its purpose in the individual case before them. That is,
rather than literal strategies of interpretation, the judge may attempt
to apply the rule as the agency would interpret the rule in that
particular context.
However, in both interpretation and application, a judge should
be mindful of the effect policy pronouncements have on the public.
Regardless of the policy pronouncement's formal effect, a member of
the public to which the policy applies would be ill-advised to ignore
it; hence the pronouncement creates a variety of agency law.125 The
public relies on all forms of policy expression (if they recognize any
difference), hence administrative judges should feel some pressure to
follow a pronouncement's language. Where a person relies on a rule,
a judge should follow the rule because a court will hold the agency to
the rule. Even where an individual did not detrimentally rely on the
rule, the administrative judge should understand that the general
public looked to the rule for guidance. For a judge to take undue
liberties with the language of policy statements, regardless of a
particular individual's detriment in relying on the rule, seemingly
disadvantages those covered by the particular administrative program.
124. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995) (stating that
"[t]he APA does not require that all the specific applications of a rule evolve by
further, more precise rules rather than by adjudication").
125. Anthony has done the most to develop this argument. Recently, he
addressed circumstances under which government guidance documents, advisories,
opinion letters, bulletins, inspection manuals, and press releases effectively bind
persons outside the agency in a practical, as opposed to legal, sense. Robert A.
Anthony, Three Settings in Which Nonlegislative Rules Should Not Bind, 53
ADMIN. L. REv. 1313 (2001).
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Thus, considerations of fairness counsel an administrative judge
generally to give effect to both nonlegislative and legislative rules.
Like superior precedent, affording judges policy discretion
regarding agency rules demands strong agency review to reassert the
value of consistency, the authority of the agency over policy, and any
process values compromised by straying from the rule as
promulgated. A system balancing flexibility and stability requires the
placement of ultimate authority in the agency. Each individual
administrative program may strike the appropriate balance
differently, determining the appropriate attitude for the agency's
judges to take towards agency rules and policy pronouncements.
Policymaking should be seen as a coordinated effort in which the
judge's individual decisions contribute to policy development rather
than an adversarial process in which the judge struggles against the
agency's policymaking efforts.
To further this cooperative effort, an agency may consider taking
advantage of judges' experiences and perspectives when developing
agency rules. While ethical rules seemingly prohibit such
participation, the commentary to the Judicial Code observes that "a
judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement of the
law, the legal system, and the administration of justice .... To the
extent that time permits, a judge is encouraged to do so . . ,126
Judicial participation in administrative policymaking offers the same
benefits discussed in the Code, indeed administrative judges have
even more to contribute as active participants in administrative
policymaking. However, the canon contains the hortatory phrase
"subject to the requirements of this Code." 127 The commentary notes,
"This phrase is included to remind judges that the use of permissive
language in various Sections of the Code does not relieve a judge
from the other requirements of the Code that apply to the specific
128
conduct."'
Attention to structuring judicial participation in agency
policymaking is important to tapping this valuable resource and
assuring that it falls within the appropriate range of judicial-type
126. ABA CODE, supra note 96, at Canon 4B, cmt. [1].
127. Id. at Canon 4B.

128. Id. at cmt. [2].
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activities. For example, an agency may encourage judges to identify
troublesome issues and recommendations as to possible
resolutions. 129 Agencies with large numbers of administrative judges
(or in independent corps systems described below), might create an
advisory committee of judges.1 30 As long as these contributions are
open and made publicly available, they are not objectionable. In
short, administrative adjudicators can provide a valuable resource to
agencies formulating rules and policy.
1I. APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDGE POLICY ANALYSIS

Recognizing and advocating a role for administrative judges in
administrative policymaking requires a careful inquiry into the norms
for their policy judgments. Administrative judges are, and should be,
active participants in the administrative policymaking function.
However, if administrative judges are delegated this responsibility,
and freed from the mere application of the agency's policy
129. In order to take advantage of the expertise of judges in those systems, the
French have regularized the submission by the courts of recommendations for
legislation. One scholar observed:
"[T]he Court of Cassation [the highest general law court] was
very well placed to assess and comment upon the shortcomings of
laws it applies on a day-to-day basis, notably spotting conflicting
or outdated texts, and texts whose strict application may lead to
injustice. The judiciary ... being involved in the shaping of the
law through its case law, could only have a positive influence on
the process of law reform if someone were to take the trouble to
listen to what it had to say. In fact ... the best way to reform the
law in practical terms was through the joint efforts of judges and
legislators acting in partnership, something . . . that the annual
report of the Court was trying to achieve."
EVA STEINER, FRENCH LEGAL METHOD 115-16 (2002).
130. The conventional judiciary is a regular participant in the legislative
process. Moreover, the Supreme Court in the classic separation of powers case,
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988), seemed to accept the employment
of judges in rulemaking. The Court held that neither the Commission's placement in
the judiciary or the requirement that some federal judges serve as commissioners
violated separation of powers. Id. at 412. Surely, if these members of the judiciary
may participate in, and indeed form the heart of, a rulemaking agency, there can be
neither legal impediment nor ethical objection to the administrative judiciary doing
likewise.
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expression, they must be conscious of the forces likely to operate on
their policy choices.
Administrative judges facing a policy issue must be consciously
aware of the perceptual influences likely to affect their decisions.
Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich applied the findings of one study,
which identified certain honest "cognitive" distortions, to measure
the impact of cognitive biases on judicial judgment. 13 1 They noted:
"Psychologists have learned that human beings rely on mental
shortcuts, which psychologists often refer to as 'heuristics,' to make
complex decisions. Reliance on these heuristics facilitates good
judgment most of the time, but it can also produce systematic errors
in judgment."'' 32 These commentators demonstrate that judges are
vulnerable to cognitive illusions generated by heuristics.133 For
example, measuring the effect of "framing," the categorization of
decisions according to salient reference points, they found that
framing "influenced the development of legal doctrine."'1 34 Along
with the other heuristics, one would expect this heuristic could have
some effect-even a considerable effect-on policy judgments by
administrative adjudicators. The commentators' suggested remedies
131. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
825 (2001).

CORNELL L. REv.

777,

132. Id. at 780. But see Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social
Conformity, and JudicialReview of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 486,

509 ( 2002) (arguing that appellate courts, unlike trial courts and many
administrative adjudicators, have self-correcting mechanisms for these errors).
Social psychology research has demonstrated that a conscious, rational mental
process does not always lead to a better decision. See generally SUSAN FISKE &
SHELLY TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 399-402 (2d ed. 1991). One recent study is
particularly interesting. See Timothy Wilson & Jonathan Schooler, Thinking Too
Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preference & Decisions, 60 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 181 (1991). The researchers evaluated certain

types of choices in terms of the subjects' satisfaction and found that "rational"
decisionmaking produced inferior choices in terms of the subjective preferences of
those subjects. Id. at 190. One reported study, evaluating student course selection,
suggested that some choices might be objectively inferior as well. That study found
that the "rational" choices were inferior to the "intuitive" choices when measured
against the opinions of the faculty and the recommendations of students who had
previously taken the course. Id.
133. Guthrie et al., supra note 131, at 782.

134. Id. at 798.
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thus become particularly relevant. They advise: "Only if increased
attention and greater deliberation enable judges to abandon the
heuristics that they are otherwise inclined to rely upon can they avoid
the illusions of judgment that these heuristics produce.'" 135 This
supports the conclusion that the best cure for these "errors," perhaps
particularly in policy judgments,
is conscious attention to these
36
flaws.'
potential decisionmaking
Experience and anecdotal evidence suggest that judges of all
varieties are not immune from personal motivations. As
policymakers, administrative judges must also confront the danger of
being ruled by their individual biases. Policy preferences in general
have long been accepted, and to some extent encouraged, in both
conventional and administrative adjudicators.' 37 While administrative
judges may demonstrate and express such biases, the system cannot
allow these personal biases to rule administrative policy.
Consequently, if administrative judges are to have a policymaking
role, they must be careful to examine the motivations behind their
policy choices. Additionally, the administrative review authority
should recognize these biases and assure they are consistent with the

135. Id. at 784. They investigate anchoring (making estimates based on
irrelevant starting points), framing (treating economically equivalent gains and
losses differently), hindsight bias (perceiving past events to have been more
predictable than they actually were), the representativeness heuristic (ignoring
important background statistical information in favor of individuating information),
and egocentric biases (overestimating one's own abilities). Id.
136. Id. at 819.
137. For example, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive
Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 554
(2002), noting:
A key lesson of cognitive psychology is that even people
with good motives tend to make bad choices in certain,
predictable circumstances. Identifying those circumstances is at
least as significant to diagnosing public policy failures as is
focusing on the motives of key regulatory actors.
Id. But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for
Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1165, 1168 (2003) (noting that restructuring
decisions to avoid misleading heuristics means that "[t]his cognitive cost, like a
transaction cost, might support adopting a particular legal rule constraining
individual choice if the cost is high enough or an inexpensive reform reduces the
cognitive cost in some way").
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administrative program.
Administrative judges should also be conscious of the way life
experiences affect their judgment. 39 For example, Sisk, Heise, and
Morriss measured the proposition "that social background of personal
attributes of judges shape personal and policy values that directly
influence judicial decisions. ' 140 The study generally agreed with
others that sociological background characteristics are not very
helpful in understanding judging. 14 1 However, the study found that
certain nonobjective factors affected judicial decisionmaking. 142 They
reported that "our study found nearly every prior employment
variable of these judges, with the exceptions of law professor and
prosecutorial experience), to be
political experience (and perhaps
143
manner."'
some
in
significant
138. Judge Hardwicke, the dean of panel judges, summarized:
It would be highly improper for an administrative judge to
color any decision with the ALJ's personal outlook or subjective
viewpoint. However, intuition and instinct are reasonable, even
necessary, for the AU insofar as they relate to the overarching
mission of the agency on the one hand, and to requisite
uncompromising fairness and impartiality for the citizen on the
other.
Hardwicke, supra note 90, at 439.
139. It is unclear how susceptible judges, in general, are to more personal
motivations because studies, legal and behavioral, persist in seeing judges as
otherworldly. Even legal realists, who challenge the idea that doctrines rule judges,
believe that they are ruled by individual equity and sincere policy preferences rather
than general principles. Even those who view judges as just another set of
maximizers perceive that they maximize their view of social welfare, not-as the
rest of us-their personal advantages. Schauer observed: "In sharing this common
ground of belief that what really matters to judges are their sincere policy
preferences . . . [investigators] tend to ignore or downplay the possibility that
judges, no less than legislators and bureaucrats, have strong career-based selfinterests that often inform or dominate their policy preferences." Schauer,
Incentives, supra note 4, at 620. He suggests that we consider the possibility that
judges are more driven by rational self-interest than we often concede. Id. at 62021.
140. Sisk et al., supra note 42, at 1385.
141. Id. at 1387.
142. Id. at 1470.
143. Id. Administrative judges might actually be less susceptible to their
experience; however, it might be significant, for example, that prior prosecutorial
experience does not make a difference since that is comparable to prior agency staff
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Career aspirations can also affect policy judgments. The study
confirmed earlier research indicating that advancement affects judges.
144 However, career considerations may be less influential with
administrative judges than with conventional judges. Administrative
judges tend to be at the end of a career path, thus career motives may
be less compelling. Still, adopting suggestions for countering these
motivations may be helpful: "At the same time, we have discovered
that this variable does not operate in isolation but evolves with the
circumstances of the litigation and the theoretical underpinnings of
the case." 145 In other words, the system and the judges can correct the
motivation if they are sensitized to it.
Of course, less innocent motivations can also affect adjudicators'
policy initiatives. One study supports the conclusion that judges
pursue policy preference strategies that are sensitive to political
actors.146 In a separate empirical study of EPA cases, Jordan
concluded:
I would not characterize these results as
demonstrative strategic ideological voting. To the
contrary, as Judge Wald has argued, they appear to
reflect differences in . . . "personalit[ies] and life

experiences that lead the judge to vote Democratic or
adherence to
Republican" in the first place, rather than
47
a party or personal ideological agenda.'
experience.
144. Id. at 1493 ("[W]e and Cohen have both confirmed that promotion
potential is a factor in understanding lower federal court behavior.") (citing Mark
Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior of What's 'Unconstitutional' About the
Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183 (1991)).
145. Sisk et al., supra note 42, at 1493.
146. A study has shown that the Supreme Court is conscious of political actors
in setting its agenda. See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Jennifer Nicoll Victor,
Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An Empirical
Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 403 (2002) ("Our analysis of the data leads
us to conclude that the justices do indeed consider the preferences and likely
responses of other political actors in deciding whether to grant certiorari.").
147. William Jordan III, Judges, Ideology, and Policy in the Administrative
State: Lessons from a Decade of Hard Look Remands of EPA Rules, 53 ADMIN. L.
REv. 45, 99 (2001) (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as
Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the HarvardLaw Review and Other Great
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While this is encouraging in terms of partnership, it suggests a
challenge to objectivity that may create an inappropriate motivation
for policy disagreements with the agency. In the end, it is the agency
that is to make these types of policy judgments.1 48 A system
envisioning a policy role for administrative judges must control for
49
the impact of personal policy biases. 1
Administrative judges, more so than their conventional
counterparts, may also be influenced by public opinion as they
contemplate policy moves. Administrative officials cannot ignore the
community's views in general, but the extent to which they should
allow their perception of public opinion to drive their policy
initiatives is complex. At first glance, the incorporation of publicregarding factors might be applauded. However, administrative
judges' primary concern should be the resolution of individual
disputes. Therefore, public opinion is arguably inappropriate at this
adjudicative stage. Moreover, if judges are expected to incorporate
public wishes into decisions, on what basis should judges determine
the best interests of the public? This raises the age-old conflict faced
by officials in a democratic society: Should they decide what is
"best," or should they attempt to decide what the public wants? An
expert theory of the administrative process suggests that adjudicators
should be insulated from these factors, but if the adjudication is, at a
base level, developing policy, then the process cannot remain
insensitive to the public's views. However, administrative judges
might not be the proper adjudicators to weigh public opinion since
discerning public opinion is arguably outside the realm of their
function and expertise. Administrative judges should be sensitive to
the public regarding certain factors yet still leave public opinion to
the "political" elements of the administrative process.
All people, including judges, respond to the group of which they
are a member. 150 Judge Posner observed:
Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887, 891 (1987)).
148. Moreover, administrative judges do not have the protections of members
of the conventional federal judiciary---certainly not the constitutional protectionand might face more deep-rooted incentives.
149. See supra note 139.
150. See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 85, at 161 (stating that "the behavior
of judges is primarily governed by internally generated norms that can be altogether
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[E] very judge, trial and appellate, is a member of a
community of judges-the predecessors
and
successors of the current judges, as well as the current
judges themselves. Judicial decision making is
collective in a profound sense, and the importance of
institutional
values in such a setting should be self15 1
evident.
Revesz's studies observed the impact of group politics in the D.C.
Circuit. 152 Chief Judge Edwards vituperatively challenged these
studies, but Edwards appears to accept the effects a judicial
community has on decisions. 153 Revesz found, in essence, a tendency
towards cooperative behavior within the circuit and the individual
panels. Cross and Tiller confirmed this behavior within the federal
circuits and panels and asserted that it is not ideology but the
dynamics of cooperation that influences judicial behavior.154 Whether
the behavior in the D.C. Circuit or others is crassly partisan or even
ideological is irrelevant to the inquiry. Notable is that a community of
judges can be expected to act cooperatively, and hence judicial
decisions might be distorted by collective influences, perhaps termed
internal politics or judicial culture. Individual cases should not be
affected by this cultural ethos. Administrative adjudicative regimes
different from the officially stated organizational rules").
151. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 258

(1985); see also Lynn Stout, Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1605, 1612 (2002) (noting hundreds of studies showing that "[als a rule of
thumb, experimenters have found that cooperation rates in social dilemmas average
about fifty percent"). Three factors determine socially conscious behavior: a
tendency to do what one is told by an authority figure, a sense of membership in a
common group, and a degree of anticipation that one's colleagues will cooperate.
Id. at 1615-16.
152. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, supra note 5; Revesz, Ideology, supra
note 5; see also Revesz, Litigation and Settlement, supra note 5.
153. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making in the D.C. Circuit,
84 VA. L. REv. 1335 (1998); Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of
Numbers (and Unsupported Claims of Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 723
(2002).

154. Cross & Tiller, supra note 5, at 2174. But see Richard J. Pierce Jr., Two
Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia
Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 30307 (explaining decisions by individual policy preferences and politics).
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create a variety of communities, from agencies with only a few
judges to the Social Security Administration with some 1100 judges,
The best solution, in the
to the state central panels analyzed below.
155
dangers.
the
to
attention
conscious
end, is
Individual or collective motivations can be mitigated by a natural
tendency of the judiciary in favor of impartiality and integrity. 156 The
"rational maximizer" perception of judges would predict behavior in
favor of enhancing individual policy objectives and prestige.
However, public choice admits that this model lacks predictive power
regarding judicial behavior, though support for this behavior is found
in other public officials. 157 Judges as policymakers cannot be
understood simply as rational maximizers in the public choice model.
Hirschman observed:
A court, properly briefed, can-and shouldascertain and move in the direction of the public
interest. . . . The courts will not always be right. As
Thomas Kuhn points out, knowledge moves forward
on wheels of necessary hypotheses. But unlike the
choice school, it
radical agnosticism of the pure15 public
8
enterprise.
is at least a worthy
Judges will do their jobs fairly and faithfully if they are esteemed

155. Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 85, at 169-70 ("Social sanctions in a
closely knit group [such as judges] whose members repeatedly interact are likely to
be highly effective. If these informal nonlegal sanctions work effectively, an
expensive, formal enforcement system may be unnecessary.").
156. Stout demonstrated that judges will try to do the "right thing." Stout,
supra note 151, at 1612.
157. See, e.g., Richard Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1993) ("The
economic analyst has a model of how criminals and contract parties, injurers and
accident victims, parents and spouses-even legislators, and executive officials
such as prosecutors-act, but falters when asked to produce a model of how judges
act."); Edward Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysisof Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1399 (1996) ("[N]o stable
[pdblic choice] theory has emerged to explain the behavior of judges .... ").
158. Linda Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of
Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 646, 704 (1998) (citation omitted).
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for doing so. 159 This hankering after esteem affects highly visible
adjudicators in an interesting way: they tend to want to impress
academics and journalists. 160 Lower courts are less visible, and hence
seek esteem from other judges and practitioners. 16' Thus,
administrative judges can be expected to perform their duties well if
their contributions, including their policy roles, are valued by the
agency and others. 62 Agencies at odds with judges over proper policy
roles likely affect the judges' performances not only in policymaking
but also in other duties. Policy innovations and adjustments give
judges a chance to shine and offer an opportunity for judges to
perform at their best. Epstein observed that judges are likely to
attempt to increase their influence and prestige but are forced to do so
through excellent decisions. 63
In general, the pitfalls above do not argue against policy
participation by administrative judges. Rather, judges should be
conscious of potential distortions and should be trained to deal with
them. 164 Both remedies are impeded by ignoring the policymaking
role of judges. Careful agency review is necessary to mitigate
individual influences in order to develop a unified and objective
policy. Policy biases expressed in administrative policy should be
those of the agency head who has been delegated that function, and
who will ultimately be held accountable. Moreover, consistency and
equal treatment within a program requires the unifying influence of
the agency over administrative judges. Judges perform a formative
159. Schauer, Incentives, supra note 4, at 573.

160. Id. at 628.
161. Id. at 629-31.
162. But see Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J.

1051, 1052 (1995) (indicating that while "craft" is an important limitation on
conventional judges because they care about the perception of their competence,
administrative law doctrines are more open-ended so that administrative judges
have more discretion, and hence "craft" is less of a limitation on their ideological
biases).
163. Richard Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations
of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REv. 827, 838 (1990). The structure of the
judiciary successfully counteracts certain risks. Id. at 831-32.
164. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 137, at 593 ("Probably the key
insight of the cognitive psychological model is that the policymaking process
should be designed to exploit the distinctive strengths, and compensate for the
distinctive weaknesses, of experts and laypersons.").
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role in the dynamics of policymaking, consequently the system
should channel their participation in order to assure integrity in the
overall policymaking endeavor.
IV. BUILDING A RECORD FOR POLICYMAKING

As contributors to the administrative policymaking enterprise,
administrative judges offer original solutions balancing equal
treatment and consistency against individualizing and advancing
administrative policy. Policy evolution is facilitated by administrative
judges in an equally significant way by developing the record
necessary for consideration of policy issues. Administrative judges
should be aware of their responsibility, and the system should provide
more opportunities for judges to fulfill this responsibility. Therefore,
considering the development of the policymaking record in
adjudication is particularly relevant.
A. An Active Role for Administrative Judges in
Building a Policymaking Record
The record provides the policy analysis throughout the
adjudicative machinery with the information needed to develop
policy. Policy in adjudication requires that the facts compiled in the
hearing-level record adequately support policy determinations and the
justification for those decisions. In the end, the administrative judges
must be responsible for the adequacy of the record for this purpose.
Fortunately, administrative law permits administrative65adjudicators to
actively participate in the development of the record. 1
Adjudication decides individual rights or duties, consequently it
focuses on facts related to the specific dispute, "adjudicative facts,"
66
and its procedures are designed to serve this purpose. 1
165. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995) ("ALJs have a duty to
develop a full and fair record in social security cases."); Yanopoulos v. Dep't of the
Navy, 796 F.2d 468, 471 (Fed. Cir. 1986). But see Jeffrey Wolfe & Lisa Proszek,
InteractionDynamics in FederalAdministrative Decision Making: The Role of the
Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 298-302

(1997).
166. Adjudicative facts are "facts concerning immediate parties"distinguished from policy-related facts or "legislative facts," discussed below.
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Policymaking requires the development of more general or societal
facts, called "legislative facts."' 167 An agency needs legislative facts to
support and justify its policy conclusions. Obviously, the power to
identify and find those facts constitutes a considerable part of the
power to make policy. But, in adjudication, even some specific facts
may be relevant to policy issues. Woolhander's observation is
particularly important for our purposes: "The line between
adjudicative and legislative facts is indistinct, however, because
decisionmakers use even the most particularized facts to make legal
rules. ' 6 In short, the administrative adjudicative record must include
facts, of whatever category, necessary to resolve policy issues as well
as resolve the individual dispute.
Flexible application of the traditional evidentiary rules permitted
in many administrative adjudicative settings might go some distance
to facilitate a policymaking record. Administrative adjudications are
governed by an array of evidentiary rules, most leaving the
administrative judge with considerable discretion. 169 Evidence is
admitted in administrative proceedings for "what it is worth."
Evidence clearly relevant to a policy question, even if tangential to
the specific dispute, might then0 be admitted as relevant to the general
resolution of the controversy.17
Kenneth Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative

Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942) Kenneth Davis, later to become a
major administrative law scholar, distinguished adjudicative facts from legislative
facts for determining the appropriateness of judicial notice. Id. The distinction is
also important to the rules regarding judicial notice. See FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory
committee's note [hereinafter EVIDENCE RULES].
167. The person who invented the distinction defined such facts: "When a
court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting legislatively ....

[T]he facts

which inform the tribunal's legislative judgment may be called legislative facts." 2
KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 283 (1960). Legislative facts are

contrasted from adjudicative facts and the facts necessary to resolve the relevant
individual dispute.
168. Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the JudicialReception of Legislative Facts,
41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 114(1988).
169. See Richard Pierce, Use of FederalRules of Evidence in FederalAgency
Adjudications, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987).

170. Often, information supporting policy is technically hearsay, or has the feel
of hearsay, and administrative law allows it. For example, often such information
takes the form of reports and published studies. General admissibility of hearsay
has been particularly accepted. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
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Unfortunately, the administrative hearing, like the trial, is
controlled by the litigants. The record depends on the quality, energy,
and-more significantly-the focus of the lawyers. Policy issues
usually appear peripheral and are rarely directly relevant to the
concerns of the individual litigant. The parties-even the agency
staff-are not motivated to introduce those facts because they may
not be necessary to resolve the particular dispute. Indeed, the parties
may have some incentive to divert attention from these facts. At the
hearing stage, only the administrative judge will likely feel some need
for a record adequate to resolve pivotal policy issues of a broader
nature. Yet, in the common-law system, judges have virtually no
affirmative duty to develop the facts. 17 1 The judge's role, whether a
conventional or administrative judge, is to assure the "quality" of that
information by applying certain preordained and traditional rules of
evidence.
The common-law tradition inhibits a more active fact-gathering
role for judges. Yet, somewhat inconsistently, the tradition expects
judges to evolve the law. This contradiction is even more pronounced
in the administrative adjudicative context. The system cannot excuse
administrative judges from assuring an adequate record on facts
relevant to policy issues they or the agency might face. 172 Agencies
must insist that judges perform this role because policy judgments
must be supported in a variety of arenas-including judicial review.
Traditionally, policy decisions were subject to review under an abuse
of discretion or arbitrariness standard.173 Though limited scrutiny,

But see Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405-06 (3d Cir. 2003) (relying on
unreliable hearsay violates procedural due process).
171. ABA CODE, supra note 96, at Canon 3(B)[7] ("A judge must not
independently investigate facts in a case and must consider only the evidence

presented.").
172. Administrative law envisions an active role for administrative judges in
assuring the adequate development of specific or adjudicative facts as well. 2
KOCH, supra note 2, § 5.25[2]. It creates a substantial tension between this duty and
the common-law tradition of passive judging. However, this piece focuses on
perhaps the more compelling conceptual problem of providing an adequate record

for policymaking in adjudication within the common-law tradition.
173. E.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Fed. Labor Relations
Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983).
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these word formulas often result in a test of whether the agency
considered all possibilities and had adequate support for its policy
conclusions.174 Therefore, the administrative judge must assure an
adequate record exists for policymaking, especially when the litigants
are not likely to do so.
Administrative judges must assure that the record contains the
necessary technical information. Policy resolution may depend on
expertise in a number of nonlegal disciplines. Administrative law
grants considerable deference to the agency's expert judgment and
the judges must be empowered to actively build this aspect of the
record.175 Administrative judges have considerable discretion to
admit expert evidence.1 76 The administrative judge may rely on an
agency expert, 177 but administrative judges rarely have independent
authority to seek other expert advice or even to call their own
experts.1 78 While party control of the record is acceptable for
[Ain agency acting within its authority to make policy
choices consistent with the congressional mandate should receive
considerable deference from courts, provided, of course, that its
actions conform to applicable procedural requirements and are
not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise
in accordance with law."
Id.; Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357, 1371 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding the
agency's policy was not arbitrary).
174. E.g., City of Dallas, Tex. v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir. 1999)
("[W]e affirm the Commission's policy choice if it considered competing
arguments and articulated a reasonable basis for its conclusions.").
175. Marsh v. Ore. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) ("Because
analysis of the relevant documents 'requires a high level of technical expertise,' we
must defer to 'the informed discretion of the responsible federal agency."') (quoting
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) ("Administrative agencies are simply better
suited than courts to engage in such [an expert] process.").
176. EvIDENCE RULEs, supra note 166, at Rule 702. This rule requires only
that the evidence proffered be reliable and relevant, and hence even a court need
not assure that the expert's views are generally accepted. Daubert v. Merrel Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
177. Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 678 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 823 (1992).
178. Under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, judges may seek legal advice
only. ABA CODE, supra note 96,at Canon 3(B). JEFFREY SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHics 173 (2000) ("While judges may, under certain
circumstances, obtain advice concerning the law from disinterested experts, the
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adjudicative issues, the policymaking function of adjudication would
be greatly enhanced if administrative judges could actively seek
experts related to the issues. If the expert's testimony is likely to be
important to the particular adjudication, the judge could present the
expert for examination by the parties. However, if the expert's advice
79
goes to general policy issues, the advice would enter the record. 1
A procedure is needed which would allow a judge to complete the
policymaking aspect of the adjudicative record without offending
8
0
traditional principles to the point of invalidating the adjudication.'
"Official" or "administrative" notice is one traditional method for
empowering a judge to affirmatively build the policymaking record.
Conceptually, official notice is the same as judicial notice. It enters
facts into the record without the need for formal "proof." Federal
Rule of Evidence 201 distinguishes between adjudicative facts and
legislative facts, and focuses on the process for introducing certain
categories of adjudicative facts. After some opportunity for comment,
some adjudicative facts may be noticed without proof. The Federal
Rules provide no procedures for admitting legislative facts. The
commentators asserted that "the judge is unrestricted in his
exception does not extend to experts in other areas."). In the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, access is intentionally narrowed to "legal" experts, which as
discussed below, if read generously, might be valuable in policy judgments.
Consultation with other types of experts is prohibited for members of the judiciary,
but administrative law might take a different view. Id. § 5.07.
179. The administrative process might learn from the civil-law system in which
the judges consult the experts. CATHERINE ELLIOTT & CATHERINE VERNON,
FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 129 (2000) ("The judge's powers concerning oral evidence
are very wide .... The French judge has even greater powers in connection with
expert evidence, as the normal practice is for a single neutral expert appointed by
the court. Parties do not normally appoint their own experts."); ANDREW WEST ET
AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 297 (1998) ("It is for the judge to choose the
expert . . ... "). However, the ABA CODE, supra note 96, specifically rejects this
alternative. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 178, at 172 ("Unlike the European system,
in which judges have the primary responsibility for the development of litigative
facts, American judges are generally permitted only to consider the evidence and
testimony that is produced by counsel.").
180. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKMAN, RISK REGULATION AT
RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC BALANCE 158-64 (2003) (explaining various
adjudicative procedures used by agencies to adjust the scope of regulation,
including waivers, deadline extensions, and exceptions).
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investigation and conclusion [regarding legislative facts, and] the
parties do not more than to assist; they control no part of the
process."' 8 1 The finder of fact with unbridled discretion regarding the
' 82
admission of legislative facts possesses "a dangerous freedom."'
The best practice in administrative adjudications, regardless of the
practice in courts, is to offer some opportunity for comment. This was
recently confirmed by the Supreme Court: "[i1t is well established
that, as long as a party has an opportunity to respond, an
administrative agency may take official notice of such 'legislative
facts' within its special knowledge, and is not confined to the
evidence in the record in reaching its expert judgment."' 83 Official
notice offers the administrative judge a well-established device for
obtaining the range of information necessary to build the policyrelated part of the record. Consequently, judges should use it
creatively and more often.
In addition, the administrative judge might consider whether
options beyond those provided by the litigants are necessary for a full
airing of the policy issue. Liberal intervention might be one
established method allowing a judge to expand contributions to the
record. Intervention allows the judge to permit other interested
persons to raise, support, and discuss policy issues. Liberal
intervention in administrative proceedings allows participation that is
tangential to the specific dispute.' 84 Over the years, administrative
law has developed a sliding scale of intervention in which interested
persons might participate in various forms, ranging from full party
status to filing documents on a specific issue. 18 5 Administrative
181. EVIDENCE RULES, supra note 166, Rule 201(a) advisory committee's note
(quoting Henry Morgan, JudicialNotice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1994),
although the quote referred to "domestic law").
182. Peggy C. Davis, There is a Book Out .... An Analysis of Judicial

Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1541 (1987); see also
Woolhandler, supra note 168.
183. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 298 (2000) (emphasis added)
(accepting the city council's findings regarding the harmful effect of nude dancing
in a particular area of the city).
184. APA, supra note 11, at § 555(b) ("So far as the orderly conduct of public
business permits, an interested person may appear before an agancy or its
responsible employees for presentation, adjustment, or determination of an issue,
request, or controversy ....).
185. Brice Claggett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some
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judges might be particularly sensitive to interveners who will
contribute to the agency's, as well as their own, policy decisions.
Unfortunately, interested persons are unlikely to know about the
consideration of policy issues or have the wherewithal to participate
in their resolution, especially in mass justice programs. Thus, the
administrative judge must be the key person. The judges must assure
that key opinions are found in the record to support their policy
judgments, and ultimately those of the agency. However, permitting a
judge to actually solicit intervention to obtain wide policy views
challenges our adjudicative traditions. However, within bounds,
judges should be allowed to do so-relying on Wyman-Gordon for
Y86where the need strays too far beyond the focus of the
support. yet
the better approach may be to note the need and
dispute,
individual
leave the job of considering how to incorporate broader participation
to the agency. The agency may choose to exercise its rulemaking
authority, an option unavailable to the judge.
Administrative judges have the authority to gather legislative
facts and may have a duty to seek these facts when a policy issue is
perceived. But, do administrative judges possess the authority to find
policy-related facts, especially where the facts are not directly related
to the case before them? Clearly, the agency's findings would be
enhanced by preliminary findings by the judge responsible for
providing the information necessary to make the finding-who is also
in the position of applying the findings as well as the policy. Thus,
administrative judges must have some authority to find policy-related
facts. Especially, as this Article advocates, to the extent that
administrative judges take part in the policymaking process. One
obstacle facing policy analysis at the administrative judge level is the
capacity of judges to find policy-related facts. Their expertise and
experience might be insufficient to resolve the broad and technical
facts related to a larger policy question. However, they are
experienced factfinders and possess a certain type of experience and
expertise. Thus, in the end, their initial findings will be valuable to an
administrative review of the findings.
In sum, administrative judges have a duty to assure an adequate
Recent Developments in FederalAdministrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51.
186. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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record so that the administrative review authority can engage in
policy analysis. Traditional record-building notions must be modified
to create additional techniques to facilitate administrative judges
carrying out this duty. Administrative law's openness to such
modifications could form the legal and ethical foundation for
enabling these powers. However, more than a responsibility to
compile facts is necessary, some duty to engage in a preliminary
finding of policy-related facts also seems appropriate.
B. Potential Unfairnessfrom Injecting Policy-Oriented
Facts into an IndividualAdjudication
Assigning administrative judges the responsibility to find policyrelated facts raises a question of fairness of particular concern to the
private litigant. For example, a hearing-level judge's concern for the
policy-related record might compel the judge to find facts not directly
relevant to adjudicating the particular dispute. The litigants, both the
private litigant and the agency staff, are now engaged in a
policymaking proceeding and acquire the responsibility for
representing either the established policy or a need for adjustment.
This is an unfair burden.' 87 A judge must weigh the fairness of doing
what is essentially "agency" business at the expense of the private
party. Still, the hearing level is generally the fact-gathering and
finding adjudicative stage, and administrative judges remain the
vehicle likely to be most effective in assuring such support.
Failure to confront the policy issues at the hearing level merely
passes the fairness question to the administrative review authority.
Suppose that authority, representing the agency, finds that it cannot
resolve the larger policy dispute on the record before it. Unless it is
satisfied to make general policy on inadequate facts, it is left with
making the decision on its own experience and expertise, engaging in
legislative fact-gathering itself, or returning the individual dispute for
general policy-oriented facts. Any of these would force it to choose
between inadequate supporting information and imposing an external
burden on the litigants.
187. Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95

HARV. L. REv. 393, 430 (1981) ("A policy decision made in response to a highly
focused grievance can easily impinge on persons not directly involved.").
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Where it cannot comfortably rely on the existing record and its
own expertise, the administrative review authority might seek to
improve the policymaking aspects of the adjudicative record.
Traditionally, this body has more authority to add to the record than
the courts. It does not violate due process to supplement the record
1 88
after the hearing if the parties are notified of the intention to do so.
Whatever limits exist might be less relevant to the addition of more
broadly focused policy-oriented facts and comments. Nonetheless,
this solution imposes a burden on the litigants, and superimposes a
tangential inquiry on their individual dispute.
Moreover, if the agency engages in policymaking at the
administrative review level, other interested persons will want an
opportunity to contribute facts and comments. The agency may feel
competent to consider the additional interests injected into the
adjudication, but those affected by the adjudicative-developed policy
may feel excluded.189 In addition, there is no guarantee that affected
persons will even know of the new or adjusted policy, since-unlike
rule changes-policy may be changed in adjudication without notice
to all those potentially affected. The agency may be required to
consider any new material evidence, but the duty to assure sufficient
90
opportunity for comment should extend beyond that requirement.'
Adjudicative policy development then presents the dual fairness
issues of the undue burden on the litigants to endure tangential
inquiries and the possible exclusion of those affected by that policy.
The focus of the individual dispute resolution is deflected to the
detriment of the litigants and the adjudicative process, either at the
hearing or appellate level, and is not well-suited to attracting a wide
range of views. In short, supporting policymaking in the adjudicative
188. McQuiddy v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 888 F.2d 1047,
1048-49 (5th Cir. 1989).
189. Those interests have the right to petition for rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. §
553(e), but it is not likely to satisfy them.
190. Peabody Coal Co. v. Ferguson, 140 F.3d 634, 637 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding

that the opportunity to present new evidence to address changes in legal standards is
required by due process); Williams v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1990)
(stating that a party must be given an opportunity to challenge information obtained
after the hearing); Wallace v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1989); Air
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. FERC, 650 F.2d 683, 687 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding the
consideration of new evidence improper unless the parties have notice).
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context might be unfair both to the individual litigants and to the
affected public. Still, as we have seen, adjudication cannot ignore
policy issues, and hence it must assure an adequate record for those
issues. An agency must confront these fairness issues in developing
policy in adjudication. In those cases in which the policy issue creates
unfairness, the agency-perhaps at the recommendation of the
judge-should consider rulemaking rather than case-by-case
development of policy.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF COORDINATE ADJUDICATIVE MODELS

So far, the discussion has assumed the traditional hierarchical
adjudicative structure. In the traditional model, the adjudicative
bureaucracy is internal and part of an organization in which the
agency head is the final authority. However, not every administrative
adjudicative system follows this model. In some systems, the
adjudicative machinery is structurally separated from the
"administrative" functions. In these systems, the adjudicative
bureaucracy is coordinated rather than internal. Having investigated a
generalized "hierarchical" model, we next look at the variations in
those programs using a separate or "coordinate" structure.
Coordinated adjudicative processes can be divided into two
categories. One coordinate model, taking over state administrative
adjudications, separates the administrative judges into an independent
and central hearing office providing judges to a wide range of
agencies. The second model, the "split function" model, delegates the
adjudicative function to an agency separate from that responsible for
program administration and hence program policy development. Each
model raises somewhat different questions for policymaking in
adjudication.
A. A Centralizedand Separate Office of Administrative Judges
Half the states have centralized and independent hearing offices,
known generally as a "central panel" or, better, a "central hearing
agency."
This structure wreaks havoc with the traditional
191. Flanagan identified 25 states and at least three major cities that have
proposed federal adjudication for years. James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of
the State Administrative Law Judge: Central Panelsand Their Impact on State ALI
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administrative model in several ways, but here we need to focus only
on its implications for policymaking. Given the fantastic increase in
adjudication at the state level, the trend towards this model in the
states, and the prospect-unrealized to date-that the federal
government may move in that direction, the implications are
important to this inquiry. In addition, the more visible division of
labor revealed by these processes helps illuminate the issues
discussed above.
As argued above, a dynamic system of administrative policy
development starts with the administrative judges and the hearing
level. It follows that this developmental mechanism gives
administrative judges some freedom to question established policy,
and under certain circumstances to refuse to apply that policy to the
individual case, even when its application is not ambiguous. It is
equally necessary that the agency have the final authority regarding
policy. That authority is necessary for uniformity and consistency.
Individual dispute resolution cannot be allowed to make the program
generally arbitrary.
The independent hearing office structure upsets this balance.
Because the program agencies lose control, the interests of
consistency and equality require a strong commitment to rules and
superior precedent. The panel judges, since they serve many agencies,
are generalists and thus do not provide the expertise and experience
inherent in the traditional scheme.' 2 The administrative judges are
largely denied the opportunity to participate in the evolution of
policy. Judges who stray from prior decisions exercise a kind of
capriciousness rather than participating in the evolution of
administrative policy. This creates the danger of inconsistent policy
application and removes the street-level experience from the policy
Authority and Standardsof Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1355, 1357 (2002);

see also Scalia, supra note 42, at 79 ("The problem of improper influence would
also be solved by implementing proposals for establishment of a unified AU corps,
headed by an independent administrator."). For several reasons, the unified panel
has not been adopted in the federal system. VERKUIL ET AL., supra note 40, at 17174.
192. Edward Tomlinson, The Maryland Administrative ProcedureAct: Forty
Years Old in 1997, 56 MD. L. REV. 196, 253 (1997) ("The substitution of generalist

central office ALJs for specialist agency hearing examiners is nevertheless likely to
reduce the role of expertise.").
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process.
In addition, the panel structure replaces a specialized, programsensitive judicial community with an isolated, generalist
administrative judiciary. In a sense, this independent office suggests a
community more like the traditional judiciary. While this
accomplishes the goal of structural independence, it generates a
different, but not necessarily beneficial, group dynamic.19 3 Several
studies, discussed above, show that judges work within the ethos of
their judicial community. The independent hearing office will affect
policy development and application. In short, this independence has a
price.
Some of the disadvantages may be offset by courts reviewing the
result of the independent hearing office judge's decision in which the
agency has rejected the judge's policy conclusions. If the court limits
itself to reviewing the agency's policy conclusions and ignoring those
of the administrative judge, then it will put the agency back in charge
of its policy. However, if the court weighs the two policy conclusions
and chooses the one it prefers, it arrogates power to itself as well as
destroys the agency's control over its policy. Neither is optimal for
the operation of an administrative program, for the reasons given
above.
The division also creates the specter of policymaking through
litigation strategy. If the policy is at issue, it means that the policy did
not exist or is unclear at the time of the administrative adjudication.
The agency must fill the gap through its litigation position at the
administrative hearing, uninformed by an opportunity to review the
administrative judge's efforts. The agency, even in adjudication,
should not be defining policy as an advocate. Moreover, much of the
decision will be made by the litigation staff, further compromising
193. The empirical study by Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Witrich of errors caused
by cognitive illusions, discussed above, supports the value of specialization on the
bench. Guthrie et al., supra note 131, at 825 ("[ludicial decision making might
also benefit from specialization on the bench."). Judge Wood argues that
specialization makes judging more complex and difficult to understand. Diane P.
Wood, GeneralistJudges in a Specialized World, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 1755, 1767
(1997). On specialization generally, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the
Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK.
L. REV. 1 (1995); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L.
REv. 377.
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the objectivity of the policy analysis. On balance, it is better to hold
the separate adjudicative agency to the agency's litigation position,
but even if this occurs, policymaking has been robbed of the
interaction between the administrative judge and the agency on the
policy issue. Hence, Flanagan observed that the "more subtle effect of
agency experience in the
AU independence . . . is the loss of
94
regulations."'
and
law
the
of
application
Generally, the central office system forces agencies to make most
policy moves by rules. Many see this as a good thing; commentators
over the years, starting with Justice Jackson in Chenery II, would
force agencies in this direction.' 9 5 Indeed, the administrative law of
some states requires rulemaking. 9 6 Added to that is the growing
trend in the states to force agencies to make rules only through
notice-and-comment rulemaking, and hence assure general
participation in the policymaking. An unfortunate consequence is that
the agency is doubly inhibited in the development of policy. First, it
cannot use the adjudication to inform itself on the application and
change of circumstances. Second, it cannot use guidance documents
to disclose any new policy thinking or cautiously evolve policy
without making an ultimate final commitment and engaging in fullblown rulemaking.
The panel system presents an ambiguity as to the effect of rules
on the adjudication. The administrative judges' position as a team of
generalist judges, separated into an adjudicating agency, casts them
more as an administrative court. 19 7 If panel judges are seen as
separate courts then it might follow that they are bound only by
legislative rules-rules made pursuant to delegated authority. In the
internalized hierarchical model, the agency's duty is to obey its own
rules. While some freedom in application by the judges is suggested
above, such policy pronouncements nonetheless express the
authoritative view of the agency and hence must be given
194. Flanagan, supra note 191, at 1406.
195. E.g., Gifford, supra note 41, at 982.
196. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
197. William Swent, South Carolina's AL: Central Panel, Administrative

Court, or a Little of Both?, 48 S.C. L. REv. 1, 6 (1996) ("Opponents of reform
parse the phrase 'creeping judicialization' and worry about the erosion of agency
policy and clout.").
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considerable force at the hearing level. When the judges are not
structurally part of the agency, a fundamental question arises as to
whether they are governed by the second principle at all. In that case,
they might be empowered to give all rules without the "force of law"
no more than Skidmore "power to persuade" deference.
Thus the panel system encourages administrative judges to
engage in independent policymaking in several ways. But, where do
panel judges get the policy they use in their own policy analysis? Is it
too glib to say that they have independent authority to interpret the
statute and merely go directly to the statutory language? After all,
agency policy pronouncements are not actual "interpretations" but
rather a product of the responsibility to carry forward the legislative
policy and to make policy.19g When panel judges circumvent the
agency's policymaking and engage in their own policy development,
even in the guise of statutory interpretation, they short-circuit the
intended operation of the administrative process and rob it of one of
its major advantages.
More importantly, when judges circumvent agency policymaking,
they inject their own policy biases into the system and arrogate
policymaking power. This Article has previously discussed legitimate
sources of policy analysis upon which administrative judges may rely.
Also suggested is the idea that administrative judges acting in a
hierarchical process perform an important function by questioning
existing policy from their applied perspective or initiating change. In
contrast, judges outside the agency, whose policy judgments have
some finality, create potential injustice and poor program
administration. If they are to engage in policy forays, then it is
extremely important that their efforts are reviewed by the agency in
order to protect the agency's delegated policymaking function and
guard against improperly motivated policy judgments. The panels
system unfortunately weakens agency review as a practical matter.
In addition, Flanagan observed that along with the panels, a
second trend somewhat related to the panel movement has emerged
in which state administrative judges issue decisions that are largely
beyond the reach of the agencies. "This may be done directly, by
eliminating agency review on most issues decided by an AU, or
indirectly, by making it difficult or impossible for the agency to
198. Chenery II, supra note 13, at 194.
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modify the AL~s [sic] decision."' 199 In essence, this "final order"
regime shifts policy enforcement-and to some extent evolution-to
the courts. This shift deprives the administrative adjudication of
much of its value. First, the agency, not the courts, is intended and
constructed to make policy. Second, the courts become a competing
policymaking authority, resulting in bifurcated and confused policy
development.
It is not clear that this shift to judicial policymaking makes the
policy less political. In fact, the shift may be a reaction to
uncontrollable objectivity, centralized decisionmaking, or a certain
brand of politics-not politics itself.2°° Most state judges are elected
and, contrary to commentary and the ABA, the electorate is more
insistent than ever on that system of selecting judges. 21 1 While the
agencies themselves are political, their decisions are usually the result
of the kind of objective, expert judgments they were created to
provide. 202 This is reinforced by the courts under some limiting
199. Flanagan, supra note 191, at 1359.
200. See Hardwicke, supra note 90, at 423 ("[L]egislatures instinctively
distrust an expanding, independent judiciary.").
THE

201. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALL To ACTION: STATEMENT OF
NATIONAL SUMMIT ON IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION 7 (2002), at

(2002)
http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/CallToActionCommentary.pdf
("Eighty-seven percent of state appellate and trial judges are selected through direct
or retention elections."). The report of the ABA's Commission on the 21st Century
Judiciary states:
The Commission opposes the use of judicial elections as a
means of initial selection and reselection .... The Commission

acknowledges, though, that support for judicial elections remains
entrenched in many states. With that in mind, the Commission
offers a series of alternative judicial selection recommendations
aimed at ameliorating some of the deleterious effects of elections
on the enduring principles of a good judicial system.
Id. This is not the official position of the ABA, and traditionally the ABA has been
even less accepting of elected judges. American Bar Association Commission on
Conclusions,
at
Judiciary Principles and
the
21st
Century
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/joumal/103.pdf (Aug. 2003).
202. An empirical study in North Carolina produced results that suggest
objective judgments. Daye, supra note 44. The panel judges agreed with the agency
in 76% of the cases. Id. at 1615. Agency review reversed ALJ decisions in favor of
the agency in a significant number of cases, although the number of these reversals
was quite disproportionate to reversal of pro-petitioner cases. Id. at 1617. Still, the
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review standard or instruction, hence the courts and the agency check
each other. Making the courts the sole arbiter of administrative policy
changes the politics in both kind and degree.
Moreover, only a few decisions from panel judges are subject to
judicial challenge, thus the administrative judge's decision is the final
word. Asimow observed:
So the real result is the ALJ makes the policy. And
when an ALJ, for example, makes a big holding in
favor of the private party, which is followed as
precedent by other ALJs, a regulatory or beneficiary
program can be halted in its tracks until the agency
secures a legislative change.2 °3
For these reasons, there is much to be said for Texas's attempt to
allocate functions so that the agency retains authority over policy.
Thus, the Texas statute authorized the agency to reverse ALJ
decisions only on questions of "policy. ' '2 O4 The absence of a workable
definition of policy led it to shift to specific grounds upon which the
agency may be reversed. Given the values discussed here, it might be
better to give the agency some freedom to justify their actions on the
basis of protecting administrative policy. Indeed, this is reminiscent
of Chenery H in which the U.S. Supreme Court gave the agency the
opportunity to demonstrate that it engaged in its policy development
function. 205 A court should be able to measure the performance of
agency policymaking responsibility without becoming a second
policymaker.
What is really needed is a thoughtful effort to recapitulate in the
panel system the policy exchange and allocation of authority inherent
in a hierarchical system. Such a system means that the agency must
have some authority to reverse the judges on policy grounds. On the
other hand, it means that judges should be encouraged to experiment
with policy adjustments so long as the agency can accept or reject
agency review produced only a 9.5% increase in agency-favorable decisions. Id. at
1619. Flanagan concluded from the whole body of data "that agency review
produces results that are supported by the law and the facts."
203. Michael Asimow, correspondence (on file with the author).
204. Flanagan, supra note 191, at 1371.
205. See Chenery H,supra note 13, at 194.
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their efforts. Central office systems should also develop formal
vehicles for the judges to add their experience in applying policy to
the information available to the agency. Panel judges, for example,
could have the opportunity to identify cases which show a need for
adjustment or new policy. Indeed, an agency may ask the hearing
office for periodic reports on potential policy initiatives and changes.
B. Split-FunctionModels
A few administrative schemes, known as "split-function" or
"split-enforcement" models, separate the adjudicative function and
20 6
the enforcement and policy function into two separate agencies.
One agency makes policy through rulemaking and enforcement
strategy while a separate agency adjudicates violations of that
policy.2z 7 While presenting divided policymaking results in dangers
similar to the panel systems, these are structurally different in two
ways. First, split-function systems are confined to one program, while
the panels serve a range of programs. Second, and more important for
our purposes, the adjudicative hierarchy is self-contained; both
hearings 8and review are conducted within the separate adjudicating
20
agency.
At one point, this scheme had a number of advocates. Gifford
argued: "When these [administrative] tasks raise numerous policy
issues [in adjudication] . . . then the alternative [split-function]
structure is optimal.' ' 209 Experience has not been as kind. Shapiro and
McGarity concluded: "[The Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission] is the creature of a failed experiment with the splitenforcement model., 21 0 Strauss had a similar negative reaction to the
206. See Gifford, supra note 41, at 1000-01.
207. The most visible such programs are in the federal system. However, many
states also have programs that fit the basic split-function model. Most pervasive of
these is workers compensation, which has an agency to adjudicate employee injury
and health complaints. See id. (explaining the history of the movement toward split-

function systems).
208. See George R. Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some
Conclusionsfrom the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 315, 349
(1987).
209. Gifford, supra note 41, at 971.

210. Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA:
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actual results of the split-function model in mining. 21 Because of
these studies, the split-function model has lost its momentum.
Nonetheless, Fallon argues for the split-function model in air safety
even though he recognizes the loss of some of the policy evolution
advantages. 2 12 Is there anything different about air safety, when
compared to mine safety and employee safety, which changes the
calculus? The different conclusions might result from a different
balance in the perceived advantages. The gains from agency
participation in the adjudicative process for Fallon do not outweigh
the gains from clear separation. Administrative law commentators
such as Shapiro, McGarity, and Strauss, find more formidable
benefits from agency control over policy questions in adjudication.
The split-function model also offends administrative law thinking
by eliminating agency discretion to choose between policy
development through rulemaking and adjudication. Tradition,
affirmed by Wyman-Gordon among others, allows the agency to
decide which avenue to pursue.21 3 Administrative law has established
that this discretion has significant advantages, several of which are
rehearsed above. Strauss argues that by eliminating the ability to
choose among policymaking methods, the split-function model
prevents 4 the agency from finding the best process for developing
21

policy.

The Supreme Court defused concern over the aspect of splitfunction schemes that most troubled administrative law
commentators. Many worried that the courts would arrogate power in
arbitrating disputes between the agency and the adjudicative body. In
Martin v. OSHRC,215 the Supreme Court found that Congress
intended for the Secretary of Labor's policy judgments to control
over those of the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 62 (1989).

211. Peter L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudication, and Other Sources of Law in an
Executive Department: Reflections on the Interior Department'sAdministration of
the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1231 (1974).
212. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: The Case
for a Split-Enforcement Model of Agency Adjudication, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 389, 392-93
(1991).
213. See supra note 19.
214. Strauss, supra note 208, at 1258-59.
215. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144
(1991).
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Commission (OSHRC). It concluded that "Congress did not intend
to sever the power authoritatively to interpret OSH Act regulations
from the Secretary's power to promulgate and enforce them. ' ' 217 The
agency's interpretations are dominant even if offered in the context of
an administrative adjudication before the adjudicating body: "Under
these circumstances, the Secretary's litigating position before the
Commission is as much an exercise of delegated lawmaking powers
as is the Secretary's promulgation of a workplace health and safety
standard. ' ': 18 Thus, reviewing courts as well as the adjudicating
agency may not exercise independent policy judgment.
Still, because the administrative review authority is not under the
control of the agency, the system loses the policymaking contribution
inherent in the appellate process. The bifurcation of responsibility
prevents the agency from engaging in the traditional interstitial
policymaking and totally excludes adjudicators from contributing to
policymaking. Taking the adjudicators out of the policy development
process is even more undesirable here than with respect to the panel
systems. The split-function adjudicators are specialists, whereas the
hearing judges in the panel structure are more like generalist judges
who claim no special expertise in the subject matter. Thus, splitfunction adjudicators have potentially more to offer. This means that
the system loses more by taking them out of the policymaking
function. Also, they are most likely more frustrated than panel judges
at their inability to participate, perhaps leading them to seek means
with which to inject their own policy judgments. Mintz concluded
that, while the Supreme Court has clearly instructed the OSHRC that
policy questions are to be left to the Labor Department, "The Review
Commission . . . has not [done so]; we may then suggest that an
adjudicatory agency does not easily reconcile itself to a non-policy
219
role as would a prosecutory official, such as the General Counsel.
216. Id. at 154-55.
217. Id. at 157-58; see also Allegheny Teledyne, Inc. v. United States, 316

F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (agreeing with the trial court that "only the
interpretation of the agency that promulgated the regulation matters").
218. Martin, 499 U.S. at 157.
219. Benjamin W. Mintz, Administrative Separation of Functions: OSHA and
the NLRB, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 877, 917 (1998) (comparing the operation of
OSHA's split-function process with the separation of prosecutorial and
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In short, the split-function model presents disadvantages from all
perspectives of the policymaking task.
CONCLUSION

The administrative process augments two seemingly distinct
governmental functions: resolving individual disputes and developing
government policy. Agencies perform these functions under a
mandate from the legislature and within the confines of that mandate.
Most agencies are afforded substantial policymaking authority within
their delegated responsibility. Indeed, the need for policy
development beyond the legislative mandate is usually the reason for
choosing an administrative approach over other alternatives for
confronting a societal problem. Often this function is performed by a
process focused on policymaking, usually some form of
"rulemaking." In contrast, administrative adjudications determine
individual rights and duties created through an administrative
program. However, agency adjudicators must work with agency
policy, hence even individual dispute resolution interacts with the
policymaking function. This interaction in turn contributes to the
body of administrative policy or agency law. The operation of
administrative policy development within the administrative
adjudicative machinery has been the focus of this Article.
In looking at the internal performance of policymaking in
adjudication, we see a division of functions among the various
adjudicative officials. Like the conventional judiciary, administrative
judiciaries have hierarchies of decisionmakers, and administrative
adjudicative officials at each level have different roles within the
adjudicative machinery. Each actor contributes differently to the
interpretation of statutes, rules, and other adjudicative decisions, to
factfinding, and to the policy analysis necessary to the resolution of
the individual disputes. This Article focused on the part played by
hearing-level officials, the administrative judges, and the context in
which they perform. The administrative judges launch the policy
analysis as both record builders and initial decisionmakers. All other
participants in the adjudicative process, including the courts, work
from this initial policy analysis. However, each participant confronts
policymaking functions in the NLRB).
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its own policymaking demands. Thus, each system must find its own
balance between the responsibility to do individual justice in
adjudications and the need to evolve and control policy. This Article
has attempted to provide the foundation and framework for doing so.

